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A F uzzy Preference Framework for the Graph M odel for Conflict Resolution (FGM)
is developed so that real-world conflicts in which decision makers (DMs) have uncertain
preferences can be modeled and analyzed mathematically in order to gain strategic in-
sights. The graph model methodology constitutes both a formal representation of a mul-
tiple participant-multiple objective decision problem and a set of analysis procedures that
provide insights into them. Because crisp or definite preference is a special case of fuzzy
preference, the new framework of the graph model can include—and integrate into the
analysis—both certain and uncertain information about DMs’ preferences. In this sense,
the FGM is an important generalization of the existing graph model for conflict resolution.
One key contribution of this study is to extend the four basic graph model stability
definitions to models with fuzzy preferences. Together, fuzzy Nash stability, fuzzy general
metarationality, fuzzy symmetric metarationality, and fuzzy sequential stability provide a
realistic description of human behavior under conflict in the face of uncertainty. A state
is fuzzy stable for a DM if a move to any other state is not sufficiently likely to yield an
outcome the DM prefers, where sufficiency is measured according to a fuzzy satisficing
threshold that is characteristic of the DM. A fuzzy equilibrium, an outcome that is fuzzy
stable for all DMs, therefore represents a possible resolution of the conflict. To demon-
strate their applicability, the fuzzy stability definitions are applied to a generic two-DM
sustainable development conflict, in which a developer plans to build or operate a project
inspected by an environmental agency. This application identifies stable outcomes, and
thus clarifies the necessary conditions for sustainability. The methodology is then applied
to an actual dispute with more than two DMs concerning groundwater contamination that
took place in Elmira, Ontario, Canada, again uncovering valuable strategic insights.
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To investigate how DMs with fuzzy preferences can cooperate in a strategic conflict,
coalition fuzzy stability concepts are developed within FGM. In particular, coalition fuzzy
Nash stability, coalition fuzzy general metarationality, coalition fuzzy symmetric metara-
tionality, and coalition fuzzy sequential stability are defined, for both a coalition and a
single DM. These concepts constitute a natural generalization of the corresponding non-
cooperative fuzzy preference-based definitions for Nash stability, general metarationality,
symmetric metarationality, and sequential stability, respectively. As a follow-up analysis
of the non-cooperative fuzzy stability results and to demonstrate their applicability, the
coalition fuzzy stability definitions are applied to the aforementioned Elmira groundwater
contamination conflict. These new concepts can be conveniently utilized in the study of
practical problems in order to gain strategic insights and to compare conclusions derived
from both cooperative and non-cooperative stability notions.
A fuzzy option prioritization technique is developed within the FGM so that uncertain
preferences of DMs in strategic conflicts can be efficiently modeled as fuzzy preferences
by using the fuzzy truth values they assign to preference statements about feasible states.
The preference statements of a DM express desirable combinations of options or courses
of action, and are listed in order of importance. A fuzzy truth value is a truth degree,
expressed as a number between 0 and 1, capturing uncertainty in the truth of a preference
statement at a feasible state. It is established that the output of a fuzzy preference formula,
developed based on the fuzzy truth values of preference statements, is always a fuzzy
preference relation. The fuzzy option prioritization methodology can also be employed
when the truth values of preference statements at feasible states are formally based on
Boolean logic, thereby generating a crisp preference over feasible states that is the same
as would be found using the existing crisp option prioritization approach. Therefore, crisp
iv
option prioritization is a special case of fuzzy option prioritization. To demonstrate how
this methodology can be used to represent fuzzy preferences in real-world problems, the
new fuzzy option prioritization technique is applied to the Elmira aquifer contamination
conflict. It is observed that the fuzzy preferences obtained by employing this technique are
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Decision making, in the sense of choosing a course of action from available states or alter-
natives, is one of the most common activities in life. It ranges from simple everyday deci-
sions to strategic decisions in war. To make decisions easier, a number of methodologies
have been developed, including linear and non-linear optimization (Bartholomew-Biggs,
2008; Chang, 2010; Taha, 1971), multiple-criteria decision analysis (MCDA) (Chang, 2010;
Figueira et al., 2005; Hipel et al., 1993b), game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern,
1944), fuzzy decision making (Nakamura, 1986; De Wilde, 2004), and the Graph Model for
Conflict Resolution (GMCR) (Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour et al., 1987). Depending on the
number of decision makers (DMs) and objectives, decision making techniques are divided
into four main categories: (i) single participant-single objective (such as most operations
research models), (ii) single participant-multiple objective (such as MCDA methods), (iii)
multiple participant-single objective (such as team theory), and (iv) multiple participant-
multiple objective (such as GMCR) decision making.
Strategic conflict is a common phenomenon in multiple participant-multiple objective
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decision making situations, and is observed whenever humans interact through their deci-
sions (Hipel, 2002, 2009a,b; Kilgour and Eden, 2010). For example, two or more individuals
or groups may have (i) opposing objectives, as when a seller tries to get a high price while
the buyer aims for a low price, or (ii) differing strategies, as when one political party wants
to remove the current ruler through a peaceful protest while another would like a revolu-
tion. Other human activities that incorporate strategic conflict include bargaining settings,
meetings, military actions, and peace-keeping activities (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005).
A number of formal methodologies have been developed to facilitate the analysis of
strategic conflicts and to advise on possible resolutions. These methodologies, which in-
clude game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944), metagame analysis (Howard,
1971), conflict analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1984), drama theory (Howard, 1999), and GMCR
(Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993), share many characteristics. They all provide means
to represent and analyze conflict situations with at least two DMs, each of whom has multi-
ple options and multiple objectives, which imply distinctive preferences over the outcomes.
Among these methodologies, conflict resolution researchers and practitioners praise
GMCR because of its simplicity and flexibility (Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). Its advantages
include its ability to model both irreversible and common moves. It provides a flexible
framework for defining, comparing, and characterizing various stability concepts, and is
easy to apply to real-world disputes. The GMCR methodology has been used for resolving
conflicts, including many arising in engineering, such as water resources management,
sustainable development, and environmental engineering (Hipel et al., 2001, 2008a,b; Hipel
and Obeidi, 2005; Kilgour and Hipel, 2005). The methodology can also be applied to
disputes arising in other areas, such as in social and political sciences, economics and
business.
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A graph model is a structure describing systematically the main characteristics of a
conflict, which may be either current or historical. The major components of a graph
model are the DMs, the possible states of the conflict, the movements among states that
each DM controls, and each DM’s preferences over the available states. Often, a DM’s
choices are represented as options or courses of action, any combination of which can be
selected (Howard, 1971; Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993).
To apply the GMCR methodology, there are two steps: modeling and analysis. In
the modeling step, feasible states and moves among them are usually constructed using
options (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993), although states can be defined in other
ways. A feasible state is a feasible combination of options, selected or not selected, and
a move is a change of options for a DM. In the analysis step, states are assessed for
stability employing a number of stability definitions developed to account for the diversity
of decision styles, including four basic stabilities: Nash stability or rationality (R) (Nash,
1950, 1951), general metarationality (GMR) (Howard, 1971), symmetric metarationality
(SMR) (Howard, 1971), and sequential stability (SEQ) (Fraser and Hipel, 1984). Note
that a state is stable for a DM if that DM would not choose to move away from it. A state
that is stable for all DMs is called an equilibrium of the model; if it forms, it is predicted
to persist.
To demonstrate how a real-world decision problem is formulated within the GMCR
framework, consider the environmental conflict in Elmira (a small town in Southern On-
tario, Canada) that began in late 1989 when the Ontario Ministry of the Environment
(M) found that an underground aquifer was contaminated by a carcinogen. The main
suspect was a chemical company in Elmira, Uniroyal Chemical Ltd. (U), which produced
the same carcinogen as a by-product. M issued a Control Order demanding that U take
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necessary measures to remedy the contamination. However, U appealed the control order.
The Local Government (L) was another DM of the dispute, as it attempted to represent
local interests. These DMs had differing objectives; for example, M wanted to require U
to rectify the contamination, while U wanted the control order lifted or at least modified.
The conflict is modeled as a graph model, in which each DM has one or more options
that it either selects or not. For instance, to attempt to reach a preferable outcome, U
could delay the appeal process, accept the original control order, or abandon its Elmira
operation. This interesting conflict will be examined at various locations in this thesis to
demonstrate, test and refine the new ideas put forward.
1.1 Research Motivation
Preference information is crucial to the identification of states that are stable for a particu-
lar DM. Existing stability definitions for the GMCR are based only on relative preferences,
expressed using the binary relations “is (strictly) preferred to” and “is indifferent to”; that
is, preference input is assumed to be crisp (Fang et al., 1993). A limitation of the existing
GMCR (here called the crisp GMCR) is that its associated stability definitions cannot ac-
commodate uncertainty or vagueness in DMs’ preferences, which is a major issue in many
real-world multiple participant-multiple objective decision problems. DMs may be unclear
or uncertain about the preferences between two states, perhaps reflecting cultural and ed-
ucational backgrounds, personal habits, lack of information, and the inherent vagueness of
human judgment. For example, in the Elmira conflict model, U may be in doubt about the
desirability of abandoning its Elmira operation. More specifically, the preference of U for a
state in which U delays the appeal process and L insists on the application of the original
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control order, relative to a state in which U abandons its operation, may be uncertain.
Among various formal approaches to modeling uncertainty, probability theory (Feller,
1968, 1971) and fuzzy logic (Zadeh, 1965, 1973) are two widely used platforms. These two
concepts are different in meaning, and have both strengths and limitations with respect to
their realms of applicability. Probability theory is a model of “randomness, and is effec-
tively used in areas in which probabilistic models can be calibrated using available data sets
for applications such as weather forecasting, simulating possible future events, trend anal-
ysis, quality control, and risk assessment. Fuzzy logic is based on “linguistic intelligence,
and is intended to describe a system, event, or entity, for which quantitative data may be
scarce or some of the information may be qualitative in nature. A key application area of
fuzzy logic is control systems, as in antilock braking mechanisms, automatic washers, air
conditioners, and subway trains. Note that certainty or uncertainty of preferences between
two states or scenarios is characterized by a DM’s choice and is not based on chance. A
DM’s choice is more likely to reflect linguistic intelligence, thereby making fuzzy logic a
potential tool to model uncertain preferences within the framework of the graph model.
A number of questions arise. Which types of preference uncertainties are encountered
in conflict models? Was there any attempt to use preference uncertainties in the stability
calculations within the GMCR framework? If there is a development of the GMCR to
handle preference uncertainties, how useful is it? Is there a suitable generalized preference
structure by which various uncertain preference information can be modeled? Is it possible
to develop the GMCR framework so that it can be used to calculate stability of states
incorporating various types of preference uncertainties that may be encountered in real-
world conflict models?
Only two attempts have been found to incorporate DMs’ uncertain preferences into the
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GMCR from different points of view. Li et al. (2004a) introduced a new preference structure
for the graph model that includes uncertain or unknown preference in the comparison of
two states. They considered the situation in which a DM, for the time being, might be
uncertain about the preference between two states, but knew that with full information
he or she would strictly prefer one state to the other, or be indifferent. The modified
stability definitions for R, GMR, SMR, and SEQ were also introduced to accommodate this
incomplete binary preference structure into the GMCR. Then, a partial stability analysis
could be carried out, with a plan to modify (sharpen) it if more complete preference
information became available later.
A fuzzy approach was developed in (Al-Mutairi et al., 2008) to model uncertainty in
the preferences of DMs involved in a conflict. The authors divided the fuzzy domain of
preferences into five regions with linguistic labels: much more preferred, more preferred,
indifferent, less preferred, and much less preferred. Based on these divisions, and adapting
the concepts of strong and weak stability proposed by Hamouda et al. (2004, 2006), they
introduced an analogous strong and weak stability, and hence strong and weak equilibrium,
to suggest possible resolutions of the conflict.
However, the above two approaches fail to accommodate uncertainty about preferences
between two states in any general sense. For example, a DM may wish to express his or her
preference as a degree or grade of the preference for one state over another. When a fuzzy
truth value is assumed in the option prioritization, a novel preference modeling technique
within the GMCR framework, as an assessment of the truth of a preference statement at
a feasible state in the case of uncertainty, a fuzzy score (which is a real number calculated
using fuzzy information, as demonstrated in Chapter 6 of this thesis) may be obtained for
each state as a measure of preference. Sometimes a DM may be able to provide a crisp
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cardinal utility for some states but not others, to which he or she assigns a fuzzy utility,
i.e., a utility in the form of a fuzzy number.
When information is lacking, a DM may wish to employ a fuzzy multi-criteria decision
making technique by using fuzzy weights for the criteria according to which the states
are being judged. A participating DM then finds a fuzzy weighted sum (which is a fuzzy
number) for each state as a measure of preference. For all of these cases preference between
two states is not crisp, but some fuzzy preference information is available. By pairwise
comparisons of the fuzzy numbers or scores it may be possible to obtain, for each pair
of states, a degree of preference for one state over another. The formal representation of
these degrees of preference for one state over another would constitute a fuzzy preference
relation.
In the representation of fuzzy preferences, the highest preference degree is 1.0, which
implies definite preference (or, in other words, crisp preference), and the lowest degree is 0,
which implies definite reverse preference. The degree 0.5 indicates that the states, which
are being compared, are likely to be indifferent. The interpretation of other degrees in the
unit interval, [0, 1], follows accordingly. Hence, a crisp or certain preference relation is a
special case of a fuzzy preference relation.
The objective of this research is to develop a new framework for the graph model
that considers fuzzy preference instead of crisp preference as a basic input. The GMCR




The main objective of this research is to develop a fuzzy preference methodology for the
GMCR to broaden its applicability in strategic conflicts. The proposed comprehensive
methodology aims to characterize, accommodate, and analyze potential human interactions
in strategic conflict within the paradigm of the GMCR, including fuzzy preferences. The
specific goals of this study are listed below.
1. To develop a Fuzzy Preference Framework for the GMCR (FGM) to incorporate
uncertain preferences in conflict resolution.
• Introduce the concept of fuzzy relative certainty of preference to make fuzzy pref-
erence useable in stability calculations carried out within the GMCR method-
ology.
• Propose the idea of fuzzy satisficing threshold to take into account various DMs’
satisficing behavior in strategic conflicts.
• Introduce the definition of fuzzy unilateral improvement to identify states to
which a DM wish to move, if such a move is permitted.
• Propose definitions of the four basic fuzzy stabilities, specifically, fuzzy Nash
stability or fuzzy rationality (FR), fuzzy general metarationality (FGMR), fuzzy
symmetric metarationality (FSMR), and fuzzy sequential stability (FSEQ), as
well as the definitions of the associated fuzzy equilibria, for two-DM graph
models.
• Extend the the same four fuzzy stability definitions as well as the definitions of
the associated fuzzy equilibria for a two-DM graph model to an n-DM (n > 2)
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case.
• Establish that the crisp graph model is a special case of the FGM.
2. To develop coalition fuzzy stability concepts as a follow-up analysis technique within
the FGM.
• Introduce the ideas of a coalition fuzzy improvement and a class coalitional
fuzzy improvement.
• Propose the definitions of coalition fuzzy stabilities, specifically the coalitional
fuzzy Nash stability or coalition fuzzy rationality (CFR), coalitional fuzzy gen-
eral metarationality (CFGMR), coalitional fuzzy symmetric metarationality (CF-
SMR), and coalition fuzzy sequential stability (CFSEQ), for a coalition.
• Put forward the definitions of the CFR, CFGMR, CFSMR, and CFSEQ, for a
DM, and then define the associated coalition fuzzy equilibria.
3. To develop the fuzzy option prioritization technique to model fuzzy preferences for
DMs within the GMCR framework.
• Assume fuzzy truth values of preference statements at feasible states to capture
preference uncertainty.
• Calculate a fuzzy score for each state as a measure of preference by using fuzzy
truth values of preference statements at feasible states.
• Propose a formula to compute a fuzzy preference degree for one state over
another, thereby establishing a fuzzy preference relation over the set of feasible
states.
4. To apply the fuzzy preference methodologies for the GMCR to real-world disputes.
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• Apply the two-DM case of the FGM to the sustainable development conflict.
• Apply the n-DM (n > 2) case of the FGM to the Elmira groundwater contami-
nation conflict.
• Carry out the coalition fuzzy stability analysis on the Elmira groundwater con-
tamination conflict.
• Apply the fuzzy option prioritization technique to the Elmira groundwater con-
tamination conflict for eliciting (crisp or fuzzy) preferences of the DMs.
1.3 Outline of the Thesis
The graph model fuzzy preference methodology is illustrated in Figure 1.1. As depicted
in the figure, the general steps to apply this methodology to a real-world dispute are: (i)
modeling, (ii) fuzzy stability analysis, and (iii) follow-up analysis (if needed). Each step
is accomplished by employing one or more techniques. For example, in the modeling step,
fuzzy option prioritization is employed to represent DMs crisp or fuzzy preferences.
The outline of the thesis is as follows. The present chapter mainly describes the moti-
vation and objectives of this research. The existing GMCR methodology is reviewed in the
first part of Chapter 2, briefly describing its modeling components and four basic stability
concepts, while in the second part, the concept of a fuzzy preference relation and its main
properties are discussed. The contributions of this PhD research are clustered into the rest
of the chapters.
In Chapter 3, a fuzzy preference framework for a two-DM graph model is developed






Crisp or Fuzzy Preferences

















































in a two-DM Graph Model
Chapter 4
Fuzzy Preferences
in an n-DM (n>2) Graph Model




Conclusions and Future Work
Chapter 7
Figure 1.2: Thesis Outline
two DMs exhibiting uncertain preferences. Addressing the necessity of fuzzy stability
definitions for a more general n-DM (n > 2) graph model, the fuzzy preference framework
is then extended in Chapter 4 to accommodate graph models with any number of DMs,
definitely generalizing the associated fuzzy stability definitions. To further analyze the
individual level fuzzy stabilities introduced in Chapters 3 and 4, the coalition fuzzy stability
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concepts are developed in Chapter 5.
A fuzzy option prioritization methodology is formalized in Chapter 6 to facilitate the
modeling of fuzzy preferences for DMs in strategic conflicts that feature uncertain prefer-
ences for DMs. The main contributions of this thesis are compiled in Section 7.1 while a
number of directions for potential future research is listed in Section 7.2. The outline of
the thesis is also summarized in Figure 1.2.
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Chapter 2
Background and Literature Review
2.1 Introduction
Among the four categories of decision making techniques mentioned in Chapter 1, multiple
participant-multiple objective decision making is the most complicated. This research is
intended to develop an appropriate solution methodology for it, especially for the case in
which the participants or DMs have uncertain preferences over the states or alternatives.
The GMCR, a variant of classical game theory, is a novel methodology for modeling and
analyzing disputes occurring in multiple participant-multiple objective decision problems.
The key difference between the GMCR and classical game theory is that the preference
structure of GMCR is binary, and not based on utility theory. Accordingly, the preference
inputs for GMCR do not need to be transitive. Furthermore, in a Graph Model, the order
in which DMs choose to move, or not to move, need not be specified in advance.
In this chapter, related literature on the crisp GMCR and fuzzy preferences are re-
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viewed. More specifically, the components as well as the structure of a crisp graph model
are described and the four basic crisp stability definitions are presented. Moreover, the
literatures on a number of approaches for modeling uncertain preferences, including fuzzy
preferences, are reviewed. Next, the notions of a fuzzy set, fuzzy number and fuzzy relation
are presented as bases of a fuzzy preference. Then the concept of a fuzzy preference and
its properties are introduced.
2.2 Literature Review of the Graph Model for
Conflict Resolution
The GMCR is a methodology for modelling, analyzing, and understanding strategic con-
flicts, which is common in multiple participant-multiple objective decision makings. The
main motivation for developing the GMCR was the demand for a comprehensive method to
understand conflict decision-making and conflict resolution as existing methods were cum-
bersome and often failed to provide the needed analysis and advice (Kilgour and Hipel,
2005). The graph model is designed to be simple and flexible, as well as to have minimal
information requirements. The original idea of the graph model was introduced by Kilgour,
Hipel, and Fang in (Kilgour et al., 1987), while the first comprehensive representation was
furnished by Fang, Hipel, and Kilgour as (Fang et al., 1993).
The application of the GMCR begins with the representation of a real-world conflict
problem. By careful examination of the conflict, the DMs who have direct impact on the
conflict and interest in its outcomes are identified. Taking the available options or courses
of actions of these DMs into account, a set of feasible states are generated. Note that
a state is a combination of options chosen by the participating DMs; the set of feasible
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states is a subset of all possible states, and can be thought of as the set of all feasible
combinations of the options. A DM’s possible moves among states are determined by
allowable state transitions, and are identified by fixing all other DMs’ options. Investigating
historical data or information supplied directly by the DMs, the preference relation between
any two feasible states (pairwise preferences, or relative preferences) for each DM are
determined. After these steps have been completed, stability of each feasible state is
investigated for various stability definitions including R, GMR, SMR, and SEQ for each
DM. Using these stability results, states that are stable under a suitable stability definition
for every participating DM are identified and interpreted as equilibrium states or possible
resolutions of the conflict (Fang et al., 1993).
A stability concept prescribes what a DM can do when acting independently in a
conflict, based on his or her own interests. To further develop insights into the conflict, a
coalition analysis is carried out. A coalition consists of two or more DMs who may act as a
group if they can do better together than individually. A recent development in the graph
model is status quo analysis, which investigates equilibria that are more likely to occur in
a conflict situation, to help analysts identify likely resolutions.
2.2.1 The Structure of the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution
A graph model of a conflict is represented mathematically by a set of DMs, a set of states,
each DM’s directed graph indicating movements controlled by the DM, and each DM’s
preference relation over the states. The nodes in the DMs’ graphs are common, referred to
as the feasible states, whereas the (directed) arcs of a DM’s graph are the possible state-
to-state moves controlled by that DM. Note that moves may or may not be reversible. As
mentioned earlier, in a crisp graph model, DMs’ preferences are given by binary relations
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on the set of feasible states (Fang et al., 1993; Kilgour et al., 1987).
In a graph model, each state or scenario is often defined as a combination of a number
of options that reflect the participating DMs’ strategies to achieve their objectives. In a
model, available options are uniquely represented by O1, O2, .... In a state, a particular
option may or may not be selected by the DM controlling it; if the option is selected, it is
given by a “Y” or “1” and if the option is not chosen, it is represented by an “N” or “0”.
Hence, a state is an ordered tuple of Ys and Ns or of 1s and 0s, usually written as a column
in which the number of entries is the same as the total number of options in the model.
Accordingly, if the number of options in a model is λ, then there are 2λ mathematically
possible states; however, only a portion of them may be feasible in practice because of
various option constraints (Fang et al., 1993; Peng, 1999; Fang et al., 2003).
Note that in a graph model, there may be a group of formally “distinct” but practically
“indistinguishable” states. Such a group is represented as one state using “–”s against
appropriate options, indicating that it is the same whether Ys or Ns are chosen for those
options. A state of this type is called a composite state (Fang et al., 1993; Peng, 1999;
Fang et al., 2003).
Denote by N = {1, 2, ..., n}, the set of DMs, and by S = {s1, s2, ..., sm}, m > 1, the set
of feasible states. For k ∈ N , let Ak ⊆ S×S (Cartesian product of S with itself) represent
the moves controlled by DM k, so that for si, sj ∈ S, (si, sj) ∈ Ak if and only if DM k can
cause the conflict to move (directly) from state si to state sj. Then Dk = (S,Ak) is DM
k’s directed graph. Also, DM k’s preferences are recorded by a binary relation %k, with
the interpretation that, for si, sj ∈ S, si %k sj if and only if DM k prefers si to sj (si  sj),
or is indifferent between them (si ∼ sj). With the notations given above, a Graph Model
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can be represented as
〈N, S, {(Dk,%k) : k ∈ N}〉.
Note that the graph model methodology can handle both transitive and intransitive pref-
erences over the feasible states.
2.2.2 Reachable Lists
The GMCR methodology uses DMs’ unilateral improvement lists for its stability calcula-
tions. As a basis of the construction of a DM’s unilateral improvement list from a given
state, as well as to study the countermoves by the opponent(s), it is necessary to record all
the states to which a DM can cause the conflict to move unilaterally from an initial state
in one step.
2.2.2.1 Reachable List of a Decision Maker
A DM’s reachable list from a specified starting state is a record of all the states that the
DM can reach in one step. In a graph model, the states that are joined by an arc in Ak
beginning at state s form the DM k’s reachable list from state s. A formal definition is
given below.
Definition 2.2.1. (Reachable List for a DM): The reachable list from a state s ∈ S
for DM k is
Rk(s) = {si ∈ S : (s, si) ∈ Ak}.
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2.2.2.2 Reachable List of a Coalition
The reachable list provided by Definition 2.2.1 is the set of unilateral moves under the
control of DM k. However, the GMCR methodology takes into account moves and coun-
termoves in its stability calculations. When there are more than two DMs in a model,
the countermoves are performed by more than one DM. Hence, the definition of unilateral
moves by a group or coalition of DMs is needed.
Assume n > 2. Any set of DMs, H ⊆ N , is called a coalition. If |H| > 0, then the
coalition H is non-empty. Throughout the thesis, each coalition H ⊆ N is assumed to be
non-empty. If |H| ≥ 2, then the coalition H is non-trivial.
For s ∈ S, let RH(s) ⊆ S denote the set of all states reachable from s via a legal
sequence of moves by some or all of the DMs in H. Note that a sequence of moves for a
coalition H is called legal if no DM in H moves twice consecutively. For any s1 ∈ RH(s), let
ΩH(s, s1) denote the set of all last DMs in legal sequences from s to s1. The reachable list
by a coalition can now be defined formally. Note that the coalition H ⊆ N with |H| = 1 is
trivial in the sense that it is equivalent to a single DM, and is excluded from this definition.
In fact, if H = {k}, then RH(s) = Rk(s).
Definition 2.2.2. (Reachable List for a Coalition): Let s ∈ S and H ⊆ N , |H| ≥ 2.
Define the subset RH(s) ⊆ S inductively as follows:
(1) If k ∈ H and s1 ∈ Rk(s), then s1 ∈ RH(s) and k ∈ ΩH(s, s1);
(2) If s1 ∈ RH(s), k ∈ H, s2 ∈ Rk(s1), and ΩH(s, s1) 6= {k}, then s2 ∈ RH(s) and
k ∈ ΩH(s, s2).
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The set RH(s) is called the reachable list from s for the coalition H, and any member of
RH(s) is called a unilateral move from s by the coalition H.
Note that, in Definition 2.2.2, the induction stops as soon as no new state (s2) can be
added to RH(s) and |ΩH(s, s1)| cannot be increased for any s1 ∈ RH(s).
Below is an algorithm that implements this definition. The set RH(s, i) consists of the
states achievable by coalition H in at most i ≥ 0 legal moves, starting from state s. For
s1 ∈ RH(s, i),ΩH(s, s1, i) denotes the set of all last DMs in legal sequences from s to s1
with at most i moves.
(1) For i = 0, set RH(s, 0) = {s} and ΩH(s, s1, 0) = ∅ for all s1 ∈ S.
(2) Now find RH(s, i+1) ⊇ RH(s, i) and ΩH(s, s1, i+1) ⊇ ΩH(s, s1, i) for all s1 ∈ S. Select
any s2 ∈ S satisfying s2 ∈ Rk(s1) for some k ∈ H and some s1 ∈ RH(s, i). Then, if s2 6∈
RH(s, i) and ΩH(s, s1, i) 6= {k}, add s2 to RH(s, i+ 1) and k to ΩH(s, s2, i+ 1). Also,
if s2 ∈ RH(s, i) and ΩH(s, s1, i) 6= {k} but k 6∈ ΩH(s, s2, i), add k to ΩH(s, s2, i + 1).
Continue until RH(s, i+ 1) and ΩH(s, s2, i+ 1) cannot be further increased.
(3) If RH(s, i+ 1) = RH(s, i) and ΩH(s, s1, i+ 1) = ΩH(s, s1, i) for all s1 ∈ RH(s, i), stop.
Otherwise, increase i by 1 and repeat step (2).
Note that the algorithm stops as soon as RH(s, i+ 1) = RH(s, i) and, for all s1 ∈ RH(s, i),
ΩH(s, s1, i+ 1) = ΩH(s, s1, i). The corresponding value of i is the maximum length of any
legal path for H from s.
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2.2.3 Crisp Preferences
As mentioned earlier, each DM’s preference information over feasible states or alternatives
is an important input to the GMCR methodology. A crisp preference over feasible states,
mathematically a crisp binary relation, reflects the certainty of preference between any two
states. A crisp preference is often denoted by %, and for DM k, it is given by %k. For any
si, sj ∈ S, si %k sj means that DM k finds si at least as preferable as sj, and is stated as
“si is preferred or indifferent to sj.” Therefore, si %k sj implies that DM k likes si better
than sj, or doesn’t care whether si or sj is chosen. In fact, the symbol “” stands for strict
preference and “∼” for indifference. In summary, si %k sj indicates that DM k strictly
prefers si to sj (si  sj), or is indifferent between them (si ∼ sj).
Given a strict crisp preference  on S, ≺ is defined as follows.
Definition 2.2.3. For si, sj ∈ S, si ≺ sj if and only if sj  si.
There are other representations of a crisp preference between two states si and sj. One




1, if si is preferred to sj
0, if si is indifferent to sj
−1, if sj is preferred to si
.
21






1, if si is preferred to sj
0.5, if si is indifferent to sj
0, if sj is preferred to si
. (2.1)
2.2.4 Crisp Stabilities in a two-Decision Maker Graph Model
In the final part of the GMCR study, the main focus is on examination of the stability
of states for a DM. From a stable state, the focal DM has no incentive to deviate in a
sense determined by a particular stability definition. The crisp GMCR accounts for crisp
stabilities, which are based on crisp preferences described in Subsection 2.2.3. To identify
the states that are worthwhile for a DM to move to from a given state, the definition of
unilateral improvements by a DM is provided in the following subsection.
2.2.4.1 Unilateral Improvements by a Decision Maker
Note that the GMCR methodology considers moves and countermoves by the opponent(s)
in calculating various stabilities. In the case of a two-DM graph model, the focal DM, as
well as the opponent, is a single DM. Hence, the definition of a unilateral improvement
from a given state by a single DM is needed. A state is a unilateral improvement from an
initial state s ∈ S by a DM if the state is reachable from s by the DM in one step and is
preferred to s. A formal definition is given below.
Definition 2.2.4. (Unilateral Improvement by a DM): Recall that Rk(s) represents
the set of reachable states from a given initial state s ∈ S by DM k ∈ N . A state si ∈ S
is called a unilateral improvement (UI) from s by DM k if si ∈ Rk(s) and si k s.
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Definition 2.2.5. (Unilateral Improvement List by a DM): The collection of all UIs
from a state s by DM k is called the unilateral improvement list (UIL) from s by DM k,
denoted R+k (s). Mathematically,
R+k (s) = {si ∈ Rk(s) : si k s}.
2.2.4.2 Crisp Stability Definitions in a two-Decision Maker Graph Model
As a basis for identifying the states from which a DM does not like to move away, the
stability concepts within the GMCR framework are provided here. Note that different DMs
may show different behavior patterns in responding to a strategic conflict. For example,
they may have different levels of foresight for which some DMs look far ahead before
making a decision, while others consider only immediate consequences. Furthermore, DMs
may have different perspectives about the risks of moving. Some DMs may be ready to
accept temporary dis-improvements in the expectation of achieving a better outcome in the
end, while others may wish to avoid all dis-improvements. To capture these varied human
behavior and decision techniques formally, a number of stability definitions have been
introduced within the GMCR framework of which the four basic definitions are presented
below. Note that these definitions are for a two-DM graph model. The stability definitions
for a general n-DM (n > 2) graph model are provided in Susubsection 2.2.5.2.
Definition 2.2.6. (Nash Stability or Rationality): Let k ∈ N and s ∈ S. State s is
Nash stable or rational (R) for DM k ∈ N if and only if R+k (s) = ∅.
As there are two DMs in the model, for the following definitions assume that N = {k, l}.
Definition 2.2.7. (General Metarationality): A state s ∈ S is general metarational
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(GMR) for DM k if and only if for every s1 ∈ R+k (s) there exists an s2 ∈ Rl(s1) such that
s2 -k s.
Definition 2.2.8. (Symmetric Metarationality): A state s ∈ S is symmetric metara-
tional (SMR) for DM k if and only if for every s1 ∈ R+k (s) there exists an s2 ∈ Rl(s1) such
that s2 -k s, and s3 -k s for all s3 ∈ Rk(s2).
Definition 2.2.9. (Sequential Stability): A state s ∈ S is sequentially stable (SEQ)
for DM k if and only if for every s1 ∈ R+k (s) there exists an s2 ∈ R
+
l (s1) such that s2 -k s.
2.2.5 Crisp Stabilities in a Graph Model with More than Two
Decision Makers
The stability definitions provided in Subsubsection 2.2.4.2 are specifically for a two-DM
graph model where the opponent of the focal DM is a single DM. However, in a graph
model with more than two DMs, the opponent of the focal DM is a group or coalition of
two or more DMs. Hence, the stability definitions given in Subsubsection 2.2.4.2 will not
work for a graph model that has more than two DMs. Accordingly, stability definitions for
a general n-DM (n > 2) graph model are needed.
2.2.5.1 Unilateral Improvements by a Coalition
The UIL for a DM, given by Definition 2.2.5, is sufficient for defining stabilities for a
two-DM graph model as represented in Subsubsection 2.2.4.2. However, to extend these
stability concepts for a general n-DM (n > 2) graph model, one needs the definition of a
UI by a coalition of DMs.
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Definition 2.2.10. (Unilateral Improvement by a Coalition): Let s ∈ S and H ⊆ N ,
|H| ≥ 2. Define R+H(s) ⊆ S inductively as follows:
(1) If k ∈ H and s1 ∈ R+k (s), then s1 ∈ R
+
H(s) and k ∈ Ω
+
H(s, s1), where Ω
+
H(s, s1)
represents the set of all last DMs in legal sequences from s to s1;
(2) If s1 ∈ R+H(s), k ∈ H, s2 ∈ R
+
k (s1), and Ω
+
H(s, s1) 6= {k}, then s2 ∈ R
+
H(s) and
k ∈ Ω+H(s, s2).
A unilateral improvement (UI) from s by the coalition H is any member of R+H(s).
Note that the induction in Definition 2.2.10 stops as soon as no new state (s2) can be
added to R+H(s), and |Ω
+
H(s, s1)| cannot be increased for any s1 ∈ R
+
H(s).
2.2.5.2 Crisp Stability Definitions in an n-Decision Maker (n > 2) Graph
Model
The definitions of GMR, SMR, and SEQ stabilities for an n-DM (n > 2) graph model are
provided here. Note that Nash stability does not depend on the responses of the opponents.
Therefore, the definition of Nash stability for an n-DM graph model is the same as for the
two-DM case. In the following definitions, N − k denotes the set of DMs other than k, or
in other words, k’s opponents.
Definition 2.2.11. (General Metarationality): A state s ∈ S is general metarational
(GMR) for DM k ∈ N if and only if for every s1 ∈ R+k (s) there exists an s2 ∈ RN−k(s1)
such that s2 -k s.
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Definition 2.2.12. (Symmetric Metarationality): A state s ∈ S is symmetric meta-
rational (SMR) for DM k ∈ N if and only if for every s1 ∈ R+k (s) there exists an
s2 ∈ RN−k(s1) such that s2 -k s, and s3 -k s for all s3 ∈ Rk(s2).
Definition 2.2.13. (Sequential Stability): A state s ∈ S is sequentially stable (SEQ)





The stability definitions, given in Subsubsections 2.2.4.2 and 2.2.5.2, characterize a single
DM’s unwillingness to deviate from a state. However, the GMCR methodology identifies
a state as a potential resolution, from which no DM would like to move away, referred to
as an equilibrium state. A formal definition is given below.
Definition 2.2.14. A state that is stable for all DMs under a specific stability definition
is called an equilibrium under that definition.
2.2.6 Coalition Stability Analysis
The old saying “Many hands make light work” means that working together may make
a task easier compared to working individually. In the same way, in decision making—
more specifically, in multiple participant-multiple objective decision making—it is logical
to raise the question whether there will be a better outcome when a group of DMs joins
together to make a decision, even when the DMs have individual objectives that may be
in conflict. Coalition formation is often found in various real-world multiple-participant
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decision situations. For instance, in a debate of the United Nations general assembly on a
proposal to help nations affected by greenhouse gas emissions, like-minded countries may
work together in support of amendments they prefer, or on the choice to accept or reject
the proposal.
Kuhn et al. (1983) applied some simple concepts of coalition analysis to strategic con-
flicts within a crisp GMCR structure by introducing rules for formation of a coalition in a
conflict, assuming that a coalition would last throughout the dispute. Kilgour et al. (2001)
made the first general approach to developing coalition formation guidelines and formaliz-
ing the idea of coalition moves. They introduced coalition stability, parallel to the concept
of individual (crisp) Nash stability. Later, Inohara and Hipel (2008a,b) developed coalition
stability definitions parallel to individual (crisp) general metarationality, symmetric meta-
rationality, and sequential stability, and also characterized general relationships among
them. The coalition stability concepts reviewed in this subsection are due to (Kilgour et
al., 2001; Inohara and Hipel, 2008a,b).
Below, H ⊆ N represents a coalition of DMs in N , and P(N), the class of all coalitions
of DMs in N .
Definition 2.2.15. (Coalition Improvement): A state si ∈ S is a coalition improve-
ment from a state s ∈ S by a coalition H ⊆ N if si ∈ RH(s) and si k s for all k ∈ H.
The coalition improvement list from s by the coalition H, denoted R++H (s), is
R++H (s) = {si ∈ S : si ∈ RH(s) and si k s for all k ∈ H}.
Definition 2.2.16. (Coalition Nash Stability or Coalition Rationality for a Coali-
tion): Let H ∈ P(N) and s ∈ S. State s is coalition Nash stable or coalition rational
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(CR) for coalition H if and only if R++H (s) = ∅.
Definition 2.2.17. (Coalition Nash Stability or coalition Rationality for a DM):
Let k ∈ N and s ∈ S. State s is coalition Nash stable or coalition rational (CR) for DM k
if and only if s is CR for all coalitions H ∈ P(N) such that k ∈ H.
To define the coalitional versions of GMR, SMR and SEQ, a class coalitional move and
class coalitional improvement by a class of coalitions of DM in N must first be defined.
Definition 2.2.18. (Class Coalitional Move): Let s ∈ S, and C be a class of coalitions
of DMs in N , i.e., C ⊆ P(N). The class reachable list or set of class coalitional moves
from state s by class C is defined inductively as the set RC(s) that satisfies the following
two conditions:
(1) If H ∈ C and s1 ∈ RH(s), then s1 ∈ RC(s);
(2) If s1 ∈ RC(s) and H ∈ C, and s2 ∈ RH(s1), then s2 ∈ RC(s).
A class coalitional move (CCM) from s by the class C is any member of RC(s). Note that,
because of the definition of a coalitional unilateral move (Definition 2.2.2), no DM in any
coalition in C may move twice consecutively in passing from s to any state in RC(s).
Definition 2.2.19. (Class Coalitional Improvement): Let s ∈ S and C ⊆ P(N). The
class improvement list or class coalitional improvement list from state s by class C, denoted
R++C (s), is defined inductively as follows:
(1) If H ∈ C and s1 ∈ R++H (s), then s1 ∈ R
++
C (s);
(2) If s1 ∈ R++C (s) and H ∈ C, and s2 ∈ R
++




A class coalitional improvement (CCI) from s by the class C is any member of R++C (s).
As in Definition 2.2.18, this definition ensures that no DM in any coalition in C may move
twice consecutively.
The definitions of the coalitional forms of GMR, SMR and SEQ given by Definitions 2.2.11,
2.2.12 and 2.2.13, respectively, are now provided below.
Definition 2.2.20. (Coalition General Metarationality for a Coalition): For H ∈
P(N), state s ∈ S is coalition general metarational (CGMR) for coalition H if and only if
for every s1 ∈ R++H (s) there exists a CCM s2 ∈ RP(N−H)(s1) such that s2 -k s for some
k ∈ H.
Definition 2.2.21. (Coalition General Metarationality for a DM): For k ∈ N , state
s ∈ S is coalition general metarational (CGMR) for DM k if and only if s is CGMR for all
coalitions H ∈ P(N) such that k ∈ H.
Definition 2.2.22. (Coalition Symmetric Metarationality for a Coalition): For
H ∈ P(N), state s ∈ S is coalition symmetric metarational (CSMR) for coalition H if and
only if for every s1 ∈ R++H (s) there exists a CCM s2 ∈ RP(N−H)(s1) such that s2 -k s for
some k ∈ H, and for every s3 ∈ RH(s2), s3 -l s for some l ∈ H.
Definition 2.2.23. (Coalition Symmetric Metarationality for a DM): For k ∈ N ,
state s ∈ S is coalition symmetric metarational (CSMR) for DM k if and only if s is CSMR
for all coalitions H ∈ P(N) such that k ∈ H.
Definition 2.2.24. (Coalition Sequential Stability for a Coalition): For H ∈ P(N),
state s ∈ S is coalition sequentially stable (CSEQ) for coalition H if and only if for every
s1 ∈ R++H (s) there exists a CCI s2 ∈ R
++
P(N−H)(s1) such that s2 -k s for some k ∈ H.
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Definition 2.2.25. (Coalition Sequential Stability for a DM): For k ∈ N , state
s ∈ S is coalition sequentially stable (CSEQ) for DM k if and only if s is CSEQ for all
coalitions H ∈ P(N) such that k ∈ H.
Definition 2.2.26. (Coalition Equilibrium): A state s ∈ S is a coalition equilibrium
under a specific coalition stability concept if and only if s is coalition stable for each DM
under that coalition stability notion. For instance, state s is coalition Nash equilibrium or
CR equilibrium if and only if it is CR stable for each DM in N .
2.2.7 Crisp Option Prioritization
Each DM’s preferences over feasible states, which are inputs to the analysis step of the
GMCR methodology and GMCR II (Peng, 1999; Fang et al., 2003), a decision support
software developed to implement the GMCR, are traditionally modeled by pairwise com-
parisons of states. However, it may be hard for a DM or an analyst to identify the preferred
state from a pair by comparing them, especially when the model has a large number of
options. Note that DMs’ options, whose feasible selection constitutes a state, characterize
a possible solution space of the problem under study. The greater the number of options
contained in a model, the larger is the number of criteria needed to compare one state
with another. Other techniques used to model preferences between two states include the
preference tree (Fraser, 1993, 1994; Fraser and Hipel, 1988; Hipel and Meister, 1994), op-
tion weighting (Fang et al., 2003; Kilgour, 1997), and option prioritization (Peng et al.,
1997; Peng, 1999; Fang et al., 2003) (now called, crisp option prioritization). Among these
methodologies, crisp option prioritization, which is a generalization of the preference tree,
is a very useful preference modeling technique in the GMCR. This technique overcomes
the limitations that other methods have, and has been implemented in GMCR II.
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In crisp option prioritization, each DM is asked to provide a priority ordered set of
preference statements. Each preference statement takes a truth value, either “True” (T )
or “False” (F ), at each state. A preference statement is composed of options by using logical
connectives. It can be non-conditional, conditional, or bi-conditional. A non-conditional
preference statement is simple and is given as a combination of options relevant to that
particular statement, joined by various connectives such as negation (“not”, “—”, or “¬”),
conjunction (“and”, “&”, or “∧”), and disjunction (“or”, “|”, or “∨”). The priority of
operations in a preference statement is often controlled by round parentheses “(” and
“)”. A conditional or bi-conditional preference statement consists of two non-conditional
preference statements joined by a connective implies (or, if-then) (“IF”) or if and only if
(“IFF”).
The truth value of a non-conditional preference statement at a state is straightforward.
For example, if O1 and O2 represent two options, then the statement O1 ∧ O2 is true at
a state if both O1 and O2 occur at that state, otherwise O1 ∧ O2 is false. However, the
truth value of a conditional or bi-conditional preference statement at a state depends on
the truth values of its component non-conditional statements. The truth values of these
preference statements are determined according to the conditional or bi-conditional truth
tables standardized in mathematical logic (Chiswell and Hodges, 2007).
For crisp option prioritization, each DM’s preference statements, say Ω1, Ω2, ..., Ωq, are
listed in order of priority, which are often represented vertically from the most important to
least. For s ∈ S, let Ωt(s) (1 ≤ t ≤ q) denote the truth value of the preference statement
Ωt at state s. A DM’s crisp preference between two states is determined based on the
truth values of the preference statements at those states in lexicographic ordering fashion.
A state with a truth value “T” of a more important preference statement is preferred to a
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state having a truth value “F” of the same preference statement, or to a state with a truth
value “T” or “F” of a less important preference statement. Specifically, a state s1 ∈ S is
preferred to a state s2 ∈ S (s1 6= s2) if and only if either Ω1(s1) = T and Ω1(s2) = F , or





and Ωt(s1) = T and Ωt(s2) = F.
(2.2)
If there is no such t, then either s1 and s2 are indifferent or s2 is preferred to s1. Note that
it is a convention in GMCR II that the “–”s are considered as “N”s in determining the
truth of a preference statement at a composite state (Peng et al., 1997; Peng, 1999; Fang
et al., 2003).
An equivalent scheme that can result in the same ranking as in (2.2) is to assign a
“score” Ψ(s) to each feasible state s ∈ S according to its truth values when the preference
statements are applied. Assume that q is the total number of preference statements for
a DM. Denote by Ψt(s) the incremental score of state s for preference statement Ωt,
1 ≤ t ≤ q. Define
Ψt(s) =






Then the states are ranked according to their scores; a state with a higher score is preferred
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to a state with a lower score. More specifically, for s1, s2 ∈ S, s1  s2 if and only if
Ψ(s1) > Ψ(s2). Furthermore, s1 ∼ s2 if and only if Ψ(s1) = Ψ(s2). This results in exactly
the same ranking as that obtained from the lexicographic ordering. Note that, even though
a cardinal score is involved, it only plays a temporary role in determining the ranking; it
does not tell anything about the intensity of this ranking.
2.3 Fuzzy Preferences with Literature Review
Failing to order feasible states or alternatives with certainty is the main reason for studying
preference uncertainty. Preference uncertainty is modelled qualitatively or quantitatively.
Qualitatively, it is represented by linguistic labels, such as good, fair and poor (Herrera and
Herrera-Viedma, 2000; Xu, 2004a); while quantitatively, it is given by numbers, such as
degrees of preference (Orlovsky, 1978; Xu, 2007). Because of their importance in various
decision making techniques, uncertain preference relations have been an active area of
research and many variants have been developed over the last few decades.
Widely used uncertain preference relations include multiplicative preferences (Saaty,
1980; Herrera et al., 2001), incomplete multiplicative preferences (Harker, 1987; Nishizawa,
1997), interval multiplicative preferences (Islam et al., 1997; Xu, 2005a), incomplete interval
multiplicative preferences (Xu, 2006), triangular fuzzy multiplicative preferences (Chang,
1996; Mikhailov, 2003), incomplete triangular fuzzy multiplicative preferences (Xu, 2006),
the fuzzy preference relation (Orlovsky, 1978; Tanino, 1984, 1988; Chiclana et al., 2001; Xu,
2007), the incomplete fuzzy preference relation (Herrera-Viedma et al., 2007; Xu, 2005b),
interval fuzzy preferences (Jiang, 2007; Xu, 2004b), incomplete interval fuzzy preferences
(Xu, 2006), triangular fuzzy preferences (Xu, 2002), incomplete triangular fuzzy preferences
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(Xu, 2006), linguistic preferences (Herrera and Herrera-Viedma, 2000; Xu, 2004a), and
incomplete linguistic preferences (Alonso et al., 2009; Xu, 2005c). Among these preference
relations, fuzzy preference relations are a convenient way of representing both certain
and uncertain relative preferences between two states or alternatives. A fuzzy preference
between two states is represented by a preference degree, which is interpreted as the grade
of certainty of the preference for one state over the other.
2.3.1 Literature Review on Fuzzy Preferences
Zadeh (1965, 1973) developed the concepts of a fuzzy logic and fuzzy set as effective tools
for mathematically modelling uncertainty or vagueness. Based on Zadeh’s notion of fuzzy
logic, Orlovsky (1978) proposed a fuzzy preference relation to generalize crisp preference in
a decision making situation. He introduced and studied fuzzy preference and its properties,
and the fuzzy set of non-dominated alternatives. He established that if the fuzzy preference
relation in a fuzzy decision-making problem satisfies some topological properties, then the
problem has “un-fuzzy” (crisp) non-dominated solutions.
Keeping in mind that fuzzy utilities could be a flexible way of representing utilities of
states, Nakamura (1986) proposed a method to construct a fuzzy preference, given a set of
fuzzy utilities, to allow rational decision making. Tanino (1984) discussed the use of fuzzy
preference orderings in group decision making. He defined a fuzzy preference ordering
as a fuzzy binary relation satisfying reciprocity and max-min transitivity, and developed
group fuzzy preference orderings applicable when individual preferences are represented
by utility functions, developing a method for group decision processes analogous to the
extended contributive rule.
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Chiclana et al. (1998) introduced a general multipurpose decision model that is able
to handle problems with a range of preference information: preference orderings, utility
functions, or fuzzy preference relations. First, the preference information is made uniform
using fuzzy preference relations, and then selection processes are introduced based on the
concept of fuzzy majority (Kacprzyk, 1986) and on ordered weighted averaging operators
(Yager, 1988).
Chiclana et al. (2001) also carried out research on how to integrate multiplicative pref-
erence relations into fuzzy multipurpose decision models using preference orderings, utility
functions, or fuzzy preference relations. Together with the work in (Chiclana et al., 1998),
the authors provided a more flexible framework to manage different preference structures.
This constituted a decision model that approximated real decision situations involving ex-
perts from different knowledge areas very well. Also, a number of other fuzzy preference
structures and their connections in social choices were discussed in (Banerjee, 1994; Dutta,
1987; Richardson, 1998) and the references contained therein.
2.3.2 Fuzzy Sets, Fuzzy Numbers, and Fuzzy Relations
The concept of a fuzzy preference relation is derived from fuzzy sets, fuzzy numbers, and
fuzzy relations. These three notions are briefly described below.
2.3.2.1 Fuzzy Sets
The notion of a fuzzy set was introduced by Zadeh (1965) to generalize the classical idea
of a set, now called a crisp set. In classical set theory, membership of an element in a
set is binary: an element either belongs to the set, or not. In contrast, fuzzy set theory
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allows the membership of an element to be described by any number in the unit interval,
I = [0, 1] = {x : 0 ≤ x ≤ 1}, referred to as the degree or grade of membership. A formal
definition is given below.
Definition 2.3.1. Let X denote a nonempty collection of objects. A fuzzy set in X
is characterized by a membership function, δ : X −→ I, where, for an x ∈ X, δ(x) is
interpreted as the degree or grade of membership of x in the fuzzy set.
Example 2.3.2. The set of tall students in a class can be described as a fuzzy set. For
instance, if students 1, 2, . . . , 10 are numbered in increasing order of height, one might have
δ(x) = 0 for x = 1, . . . , 5, δ(6) = 0.4, δ(7) = 0.6, δ(8) = 0.9, and δ(9) = δ(10) = 1.
Note that the closer is the value of δ(x) to 1, the higher is the grade of membership
of x in the fuzzy set. A conventional, or crisp, set is a fuzzy set, in that the membership
function is a 0 − 1 function, assigning 1 to each element of the set and 0 to each element
not in the set.
2.3.2.2 Fuzzy Numbers
A fuzzy number is a fuzzy set of a particular form defined on the set of real numbers, R.
Recall that, if c, d ∈ R satisfy c ≤ d, then [c, d] = {x : c ≤ x ≤ d} is a (closed) interval
of real numbers. The definition of a fuzzy number follows (Goetschel and Voxman, 1986;
Klir and Yuan, 1995):
Definition 2.3.3. A fuzzy number is a fuzzy set in R defined by a membership function
δ : R −→ I with the following properties:
• δ is upper semi-continuous;
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• There is an interval [c, d] such that δ(x) = 0 for all x 6∈ [c, d];
• There are real numbers a and b satisfying c ≤ a ≤ b ≤ d such that
(i) δ(x) = 1 for all x ∈ [a, b];
(ii) If c ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ a, then δ(x1) ≤ δ(x2);
(iii) If b ≤ x1 ≤ x2 ≤ d, then δ(x1) ≥ δ(x2).
Note that δ is upper semi-continuous if and only if {x ∈ R : δ(x) < α} is an open set in
R for every α ∈ (0, 1].
Example 2.3.4. The set of all real numbers close to 3 can be thought of as a fuzzy
number. For instance, one might choose c = 2, a = b = 3, and d = 4, with δ(x) linear on
each interval.
2.3.2.3 Fuzzy Relations
Traditionally, a preference or crisp preference is characterized using a binary relation. In
consequence, a fuzzy preference is defined using a fuzzy binary relation or simply a fuzzy
relation. A classical or crisp relation indicates that an object x ∈ X is either related to,
or not related to, an object y ∈ Y ; so, it is natural that a fuzzy relation assigns a degree
or grade to the relation of x to y. A formal definition is provided below (Klir and Yuan,
1995).
Definition 2.3.5. Let X and Y denote nonempty collections of objects. A fuzzy relation
from X to Y , denoted R, is a fuzzy set in X × Y with membership function:
µR : X × Y −→ [0, 1],
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where µR(x, y) represents the degree or grade of the relationship of x ∈ X to y ∈ Y .
Note that the sets X and Y may or may not be identical. If X = Y , R is said to be a
fuzzy relation on X. A fuzzy relation from X to Y is usually represented by a matrix in
which the members of X are the row labels and the members of Y are the column labels.
The entry in row x and column y represents the degree to which x is related to y.
Example 2.3.6. The relation “likes”, between two students in a class, can be thought of
as a fuzzy relation.
2.3.3 Fuzzy Preference and its Properties
A fuzzy preference is an important type of fuzzy binary relation. It represents preference
between two states or alternatives as a preference degree for the first state over the second,
and thus naturally includes both certain and uncertain preferences. A formal definition of
a fuzzy preference relation is presented below (Tanino, 1984, 1988; Chiclana et al., 2001;
Xu, 2007).
Definition 2.3.7. Let S = {s1, s2, . . . , sm}, m > 1, denote a set of states or alternatives.
A fuzzy preference over S is a fuzzy relation on S, represented by a matrix R = (rij)m×m,
with membership function µR : S × S −→ [0, 1], where µR(si, sj) = rij, the degree of
preference for si over sj, satisfies
rij + rji = 1 and rii = 0.5, for all i, j = 1, 2, ...,m.
The condition rij + rji = 1 is referred to as the additive reciprocity.
One often writes r = µR, so r(si, sj) = µR(si, sj) = rij. Interpretations of the values of
r(si, sj) follow:
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(1) r(si, sj) = 1 indicates that state si is definitely preferred to state sj;
(2) r(si, sj) > 0.5 implies that state si is likely to be preferred to state sj; the larger
r(si, sj), the more likely that si is preferred to sj;
(3) r(si, sj) = 0.5 means that state si is likely to be indifferent to state sj, or that each
state is equally likely to be preferred to the other;
(4) r(si, sj) < 0.5 indicates that state sj is likely to be preferred to state si; the smaller
r(si, sj), the more likely that sj is preferred to si;
(5) r(si, sj) = 0 implies that state sj is definitely preferred to state si.
Note that the amount of preference cannot be inferred from a degree of preference. The
degree of preference of one state relative to another is the level of certainty that a DM
prefers the first state to the second, and says nothing about how strong this preference
may be. Thus, if si is definitely preferred to sj, then it is certain that si is preferred to sj,
but there is no implication about how much more preferred is si than sj. For k ∈ N , DM
k’s fuzzy preference is often denoted by Rk.
Example 2.3.8. Tom has a cold and would like a hot drink. He prefers coffee from Tim
Hortons cafes and tea from Williams cafes, and is indifferent between them. This means
that Tom prefers coffee from Tim Hortons to coffee from Williams and tea from Williams
to tea from Tim Hortons. However, he is indifferent between coffee from Tim Hortons and
tea from Williams.
Tom’s new roommate Dave brings Tom a tea from Tim Hortons and a coffee from
Williams. Now Tom’s preference for “tea” or “coffee” is unclear; he does not definitely
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prefer one to the other. In this case, Tom’s preference can be described as a fuzzy preference
relation.
If Tom is more likely to take tea, then Tom’s preference can be represented as a fuzzy
preference with rTom(TT,CW) > 0.5, where r
Tom(CW,TT) is defined by r
Tom(CW,TT) =
1 − rTom(TT,CW), in which TT means tea from Tim Hortons and CW means coffee from
Williams. In particular, if rTom(TT,CW) = 0.7, then Tom’s preference over {CW,TT} can








Example 2.3.9. Example 2.3.8 can be expanded to represent Tom’s preferences over “cof-
fee” or “tea” from “Tim Hortons” or “Williams” and can be represented by the following
matrix:
R =






0.5 1.0 0.8 0.5
0 0.5 0.3 0.1
0.2 0.7 0.5 0
0.5 0.9 1.0 0.5

,
where CT, CW, TT, and TW denote alternatives: coffee from Tim Hortons, coffee from
Williams, tea from Tim Hortons, and tea from Williams, respectively.
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Chapter 3
Fuzzy Preferences in a Two-Decision
Maker Graph Model
3.1 Introduction
The first step in developing the FGM is to integrate fuzzy preferences into a two-DM graph
model. Note that the simplest genuine conflict has two DMs, each of whom has two choices
or strategies. To gain fundamental insights into what is actually occurring strategically and
what can be done to obtain favorable resolutions, one can investigate such basic, or generic
form, conflicts, including the Sustainable Development, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and Chicken.
For example, in sustainable development disputes, two major groups of agents involved are
usually environmental agencies and developers. Environmental agencies are committed
to monitoring development activities such that no component of a healthy environment
is significantly degraded or destroyed. On the other hand, developers are engaged in
activities intended to increase the quality of human life, and are often dominated by their
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business views of making profits. To study conflicts with two DMs, such as those mentioned
above, with uncertain preferences, a fuzzy preference model for two DMs within the GMCR
framework is proposed in the current chapter.
In addition to developing the concepts of fuzzy relative certainty of preference, fuzzy
satisficing threshold, and fuzzy unilateral improvement as tools for incorporating fuzzy
preferences in the GMCR, the four basic fuzzy stability definitions—fuzzy Nash stabil-
ity, fuzzy general metarationality, fuzzy symmetric metarationality, and fuzzy sequential
stability—are introduced here. These fuzzy stabilities are applied to an ongoing sustainable
development dispute to demonstrate their applicability. The contributions of this chapter
are partly due to the papers by Bashar et al. (2009a,b, 2010a, 2011).
3.2 Fuzzy Relative Certainty of Preference
A fuzzy preference captures preference uncertainty using numbers between 0 and 1, in-
dicating pairwise preference degree to which one state is preferred over the other. Fuzzy
preference can be thought of as an increasing function of preference degrees for which
larger preference degree means more likely preferred. The maximum preference degree,
1.0, implies definite preference. When a preference degree is less than 1.0 (but greater
than 0) for a DM, he or she perceives that either state of the pair may be preferable to the
other, even if he “leans” toward one of the states. In particular, if r(si, sj) < 1, then the
DM does not definitely prefer state si to state sj. Due to additive reciprocity, the number
r(sj, si) = 1 − r(si, sj) can be interpreted as the degree to which state si is not preferred
over state sj. Hence, the following definition describes the intensity of preference for a
state (relative to another), which will be called the fuzzy relative certainty of preference of
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a DM. Recall that N represents the set of DMs and S = {s1, s2, ..., sm}, m > 1, represents
the set of feasible states.
Definition 3.2.1. Let k ∈ N , and for si, sj ∈ S, let rk(si, sj) denote the preference degree
of state si over sj for DM k. Then the k-th DM’s fuzzy relative certainty of preference
(FRCP) for state si over sj, denoted α
k(si, sj), is α
k(si, sj) = r
k(si, sj)− rk(sj, si).
The number αk(si, sj) measures the relative certainty of DM k’s preference for state si
over state sj. It is clear from Definitions 2.3.7 and 3.2.1 that for any k ∈ N and for all
i, j = 1, 2, ...,m, −1 ≤ αk(si, sj) ≤ 1. In particular,
(1) αk(si, sj) = 1 indicates that DM k definitely prefers state si to state sj;
(2) αk(si, sj) = 0 means that DM k is equally likely to favor state si over state sj, or to
favor state sj over state si;
(3) αk(si, sj) = −1 indicates that DM k definitely prefers state sj to state si.
Denoting αkij = α
k(si, sj) for any i, j = 1, 2, ...,m, the k-th DM’s FRCP over S can be
represented by matrix (αkij)m×m.
Example 3.2.2. Let the matrix
Rp =






0.5 1.0 0.8 0.5
0 0.5 0.3 0.1
0.2 0.7 0.5 0
0.5 0.9 1.0 0.5

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represent the (fuzzy) preference of a DM, p, over the set of states S = {s1, s2, s3, s4}. Then
by employing Definition 3.2.1, p’s FRCP over S can be represented by the matrix:
(αpij) =






0 1.0 0.6 0
−1.0 0 −0.4 −0.8
−0.6 0.4 0 −1.0
0 0.8 1.0 0

.
Remark 3.2.3. The matrix representing FRCP is skew-symmetric in that, for all k ∈ N
and all i, j = 1, 2, ...,m, αk(sj, si) = −αk(si, sj) and αk(si, si) = 0.
3.3 Fuzzy Satisficing Threshold
In analyzing a graph model, one important task is to determine whether a DM is better
off to stay at a focal state or to move to some other states. A DM may wish to achieve a
certain amount of confidence in identifying a better state. The fuzzy satisficing threshold
of a DM describes his or her criterion to identify a state that is worthwhile. Note that
different DMs may have different criteria in choosing states that benefit them. The fuzzy
satisficing threshold of a DM is a number that characterizes the level of FRCP required
for the DM to find an advantageous state. A formal definition is given below.
Definition 3.3.1. For k ∈ N , DM k would be willing to move from state s ∈ S to state
si ∈ S if and only if αk(si, s) ≥ γk, where γk is called the fuzzy satisficing threshold (FST)
of DM k.
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The FST is a behavioral parameter that represents the DM’s criterion for deciding whether
to take advantage of some possible moves. Because of Definition 3.2.1, it is reasonable to
assume that an FST is positive and does not exceed 1, i.e., for all k ∈ N , 0 < γk ≤ 1.
If for a DM k ∈ N , γk = 1, it means that DM k finds a state worthy only if his or
her preference for the state over an initial state is crisp, since αk(si, s) ≥ γk = 1 implies
rk(si, s)− rk(s, si) = 1 indicating rk(si, s) = 1 and rk(s, si) = 0. The FST of a DM may be
supplied by the DM himself or herself, determined by an analyst by interviewing the DM,
or by other means such as reading background information about the DM.
3.4 Fuzzy Unilateral Improvements by a Decision
Maker
Stability analysis within the GMCR depends fundamentally on which states a DM would
move to, given that he or she could do so, starting at some given initial state. In a graph
model with fuzzy preference, this choice must depend on the DM’s FST as it characterizes
the level of FRCP to be required to identify states that are worthy for the DM. A fuzzy
unilateral improvement signals a DM’s attractiveness to move. More specifically, a fuzzy
unilateral improvement for a DM is a state that the DM could and would move to, in other
words, a state in the DM’s reachable list for which the FRCP over the initial state is not
less than the DM’s FST. Recall that Rk(s) is the set of states reachable from a given state
s ∈ S for DM k ∈ N and γk is the FST of DM k.
Definition 3.4.1. Let s ∈ S and k ∈ N . A state si ∈ Rk(s) is called a fuzzy unilateral
improvement (FUI) from s by DM k if and only if αk(si, s) ≥ γk.
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Definition 3.4.2. The set of all FUIs from a state s ∈ S for DM k is called the fuzzy
unilateral improvement list (FUIL) from s by DM k, and is denoted R̃+k, γk(s).
To summarize Definition 3.4.2, R̃+k, γk(s) = {si ∈ Rk(s) : α
k(si, s) ≥ γk}. For simplicity,




Example 3.4.3. Suppose that the matrix Rp in Example 3.2.2 represents the (fuzzy)
preference of a DM, p, over the set of states S = {s1, s2, s3, s4} in a conflict model and
that p’s reachable list from state s3 is Rp(s3) = {s1, s2, s4}. Also suppose that γp = 0.5,
that is, the FST of p is 0.5. Then s1 is an FUI from s3 for p, since s1 ∈ Rp(s3) and
αp(s1, s3) = 0.6 ≥ 0.5, the FST of p. Hence, one can find that the FUIL from s3 for p is
R̃+p, 0.5(s3) = {s1, s4}.
Likewise, if p had FST 0.7, then his or her FUIL from s3 would be R̃
+
p, 0.7(s3) = {s4}.
Remark 3.4.4. When the FST of a DM is 1.0, the definitions of a DM’s FUI and FUIL
coincide with the definitions of a DM’s (crisp) UI and (crisp) UIL, respectively.
3.5 Fuzzy Stabilities for a Two-Decision Maker Graph
Model
The concept of fuzzy stability is incorporated into the GMCR to accommodate fuzzy
preference, which is an effective tool in representing both certain and uncertain preference
information. Note that in a graph model with two DMs, the opponent of a focal DM
is always a single DM. In a strategic conflict, a DM never moves to a state that is not
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advantageous according to his or her FUIL. If there is an FUI from the current state, a
DM may consider the opponent’s countermove and also subsequent move before deciding
on whether to take advantage of the immediate FUI. Like the crisp GMCR, the FGM
takes into account these human behavior in identifying states that represent potential
resolutions of a dispute. More specifically, four basic fuzzy stability definitions—fuzzy
Nash stability, fuzzy general metarationality, fuzzy symmetric metarationality, and fuzzy
sequential stability—are introduced to integrate various kinds of human behavior into
graph model fuzzy stability calculations. As there are two DMs in the model, assume that
N = {k, l}; accordingly, the FSTs will be denoted γk and γl.
Definition 3.5.1. (Fuzzy Nash Stability or Fuzzy Rationality): A state s ∈ S is
fuzzy Nash stable, or fuzzy rational (FR) for DM k if and only if
R̃+k (s) = ∅.
Under FR stability, the focal DM is considered to take into account only of his or her
FUIs when deciding whether to move from a given initial state, and ignores any possible
responses by the opponent. Thus, state s is FR stable for DM k if and only if DM k has
no FUIs from s.
Definition 3.5.2. (Fuzzy General Metarationality): A state s ∈ S is fuzzy general
metarational (FGMR) for DM k if and only if for every s1 ∈ R̃+k (s) there exists an s2 ∈
Rl(s1) such that α
k(s2, s) < γk.
For FGMR, the focal DM asks whether each of his or her FUIs could subsequently be
sanctioned by the opponent, using one of the opponent’s unilateral moves. Note that the
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DM does not consider whether the opponent would be better off making this sanctioning
move. If the focal DM has no FUIs from state s, then s is automatically FGMR stable
in the sense that there is no FUI from s that cannot subsequently be sanctioned by the
opponent using a unilateral move. In particular, FR stability implies FGMR stability.
Definition 3.5.3. (Fuzzy Symmetric Metarationality): A state s ∈ S is fuzzy sym-
metric metarational (FSMR) for DM k if and only if for every s1 ∈ R̃+k (s) there exists an
s2 ∈ Rl(s1) such that αk(s2, s) < γk, and αk(s3, s) < γk for all s3 ∈ Rk(s2).
In FSMR stability, the focal DM looks one more step ahead (in comparison to FGMR
stability) when deciding whether to take advantage of an FUI. If there is a sanction by the
opponent, the focal DM asks if he or she has a unilateral move that escapes the sanction.
If the focal DM cannot escape the sanction, then the original state is FSMR stable. If the
focal DM has no FUIs from the current state, then it is FSMR stable in the sense that
there is no FUI from the initial state for which a sanction by the opponent can be escaped
by the focal DM. In particular, FR stability implies FSMR stability.
Definition 3.5.4. (Fuzzy Sequential Stability): A state s ∈ S is fuzzy sequentially
stable (FSEQ) for DM k if and only if for every s1 ∈ R̃+k (s) there exists an s2 ∈ R̃
+
l (s1)
such that αk(s2, s) < γk.
FSEQ stability is the same as FGMR stability except that the focal DM considers only
sanctions of his or her FUIs that are “credible” in the sense that they are FUIs for the
opponent. Note that the definition of FSEQ depends not only on the focal DM’s FST,
γk, but also on the opponent’s FST, γl. If the focal DM has no FUIs from the initial
state, then it is FSEQ stable in the sense that there is no FUI from the current state
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that cannot subsequently be sanctioned by the opponent using an FUI. In particular, FR
stability implies FSEQ stability.
Definition 3.5.5. (Fuzzy Equilibrium): A state s ∈ S that is fuzzy stable for both
DMs k and l under a specific fuzzy stability definition is called a fuzzy equilibrium (FE )
under that definition.
Note that DMs k and l may have different FSTs in identifying their own fuzzy stable
states. Therefore, FE corresponding to all the fuzzy stability definitions above, even fuzzy
Nash equilibrium, depend on both DMs’ FSTs.
3.6 Application of Fuzzy Stabilities to the Sustainable
Development Conflict
3.6.1 Sustainable Development and Related Issues
Development is crucial to the advancement of civilization. More specifically, economic
development increases standards of living, and sustainable development, as described in
(Brundtland Report, 1987), meets the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own requirements. Although development is
essential to fulfil human needs and to improve the quality of life, it must be based on
the efficient and responsible use of human, economic and natural resources. Theoretically,
development that does not cause significant damage to the planet is possible, but conflicting
motivations make it difficult to achieve. One instance is the temptation to improve an
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economy at the cost of environmental protection, for example, by not treating industrial
wastes nor enhancing industrial processes (Gore, 2006a,b; Hipel and Obeidi, 2005).
A wide variety of environmental disputes is taking place around the globe on an ongoing
basis, including the continuing controversies surrounding the reduction of greenhouse gasses
and the preservation of ecosystems (Hipel and Bernath Walker, 2010). The great sparrow
campaign (also known as kill a sparrow campaign, and officially, the four pests campaign)
between 1958 and 1960 in China is an example of an environmental disaster. Under this
campaign, sparrows were killed by peasants to save their grain seeds. However, this action
caused populations of harmful insects to balloon, leading to a major ecological imbalance
(Shapiro, 2001). An example of a recent environmental disaster is the Gulf of Mexico Oil
Spill caused by an explosion on a drilling rig off the coast of southeast Louisiana, USA on
April 20, 2010 (The New York Times, 2010; Center for Biological Diversity, 2011). More
than 200 million gallons of oil fouled the ocean and Gulf coastlines, spreading along more
than 1,000 miles of shoreline, and causing the death or harm of more than 82,000 birds,
about 6,000 sea turtles, nearly 26,000 marine mammals including dolphins, as well as an
unknown but enormous number of fish and invertebrates (Center for Biological Diversity,
2011).
3.6.2 Application of Fuzzy Stabilities for a Two-Decision Maker
Graph Model to the Sustainable Development Conflict
The Sustainable Development conflict (Hipel, 2002) is a 2 × 2 game having two DMs or
players each of whom has two options or strategies (Kilgour and Fraser, 1988; Fraser and
Kilgour, 1986; Rapoport et al., 1976). One DM represents the environmental agencies
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(ENV) and the other potential developers (DEV). ENV consists of government officials,
environmentalists, and/or community groups. The main task of ENV is to oversee develop-
ment activities to ensure that they remain sustainable. This means that the development
projects will not only be economically beneficial but also environmentally viable. DEV, on
the other hand, is composed of individuals or business enterprises, whose aim is to initiate
development projects that will be economically feasible. Generally speaking, DEV’s major
goal is to make profit. However, DEV often feels some sort of environmental responsibility;
some of them may place environmental priorities higher than others.






In summary, in monitoring development activities and their effects on the environment,
ENV can be proactive (P) or reactive (R). On the other hand, based on the level of
responsibility to the environment and society, DEV may practice sustainable development
(S) or unsustainable development (U). The model is presented in Table 3.1 in which each
cell represents one of the four possible states. For example, state s1 indicates the situation
in which ENV is proactive and DEV practices sustainable development. Figures 3.1 and
3.2 show how ENV and DEV can cause the conflict to move from one state to another. For
example, ENV can move from state s1 to state s3 by changing its strategy from proactive
to reactive, but cannot move from s1 to s2.
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Figure 3.1: Possible Moves by Environmental Agencies (ENV)
Figure 3.2: Possible Moves by Developers (DEV)
The Graph Model of the Sustainable Development conflict studied here is similar to
the one investigated in (Hipel, 2002) and (Hipel and Bernath Walker, 2010), except that
in this study, preference uncertainties between some states are considered for both ENV
and DEV. For example, when DEV practices sustainable development, ENV may not
have enough reason to definitely prefer state s1 over state s3, even though, by nature,
ENV may want to be proactive rather than reactive. For DEV, when ENV is proactive,
it may be unsure which of states s1 and s2 is better (even though it may want to choose
unsustainable development instead of sustainable development) because it is unaware about
ENV’s plans in administering relevant environmental regulations. Taking these and other
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Table 3.2: Fuzzy Preferences of Environmental Agencies (ENV) and Developers (DEV)
RENV =






0.5 1.0 0.75 1.0
0 0.5 0 1.0
0.25 1.0 0.5 1.0
0 0 0 0.5

RDEV =






0.5 0.25 0 0
0.75 0.5 0.7 0
1.0 0.3 0.5 0
1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5

preference uncertainties into account, a typical fuzzy preference model for ENV and DEV is
constructed, and is represented in Table 3.2 by matricesRENV andRDEV. In particular, the
number 0.75 in RENV represents ENV’s preference degree of being proactive over reactive
when DEV practices sustainable development. Using Definition 3.2.1, the FRCPs for ENV
and DEV are calculated, and are represented by matrices αENV and αDEV in Table 3.3.
A fuzzy stability analysis is carried out by applying the FR, FGMR, FSMR, and FSEQ
stability definitions introduced in Section 3.5 to the sustainable development model. The
results are presented in Table 3.4 in which ENV or DEV in a cell indicates that the state
in the corresponding row is fuzzy stable for the indicated DM but not for the opponent
while FE indicates that the state is a fuzzy equilibrium, under the indicated fuzzy stability
definition. In this analysis, four sets of FSTs for ENV and DEV—(i) γENV = 0.4, γDEV =
0.3; (ii) γENV = 0.6, γDEV = 0.3; (iii) γENV = 0.4, γDEV = 0.6; and (iv) γENV = 0.6,
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Table 3.3: Fuzzy Relative Certainty of Preferences of Environmental Agencies (ENV) and
Developers (DEV)
αENV =






0 1.0 0.5 1.0
−1.0 0 −1.0 1.0
−0.5 1.0 0 1.0
−1.0 −1.0 −1.0 0

αDEV =






0 −0.5 −1.0 −1.0
0.5 0 0.4 −1.0
1.0 −0.4 0 −1.0
1.0 1.0 1.0 0

γDEV = 0.6—are considered.
It can be seen from Table 3.4 that when satisficing criteria of both ENV and DEV
are weak, that is, for smaller FSTs, state s2 is the only FE under all four fuzzy stability
definitions. This result is similar to the one found in (Hipel, 2002) for the case of typical
developers who are not concerned about environmental impacts of their activities. State
s2, in which environmental agencies are proactive and developers practice unsustainable
development, represents a reasonable resolution for these developers. An increase in the
FST of ENV does not significantly change the fuzzy stability results. However, when the
FST of DEV is increased from 0.3 to 0.6, state s1 also becomes a FE under all four fuzzy
stability definitions. Recall that state s1 represents a circumstance in which environmental
agencies are proactive and developers practice sustainable development. Note that s1 is
the outcome predicted in (Hipel, 2002) for the case of more environmentally responsible
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Table 3.4: Fuzzy Stability Results of the Sustainable Development Conflict
FSTs States FR FGMR FSMR FSEQ
γENV = 0.4
γDEV = 0.3
s1 ENV ENV ENV ENV
s2 FE FE FE FE
s3 ENV ENV ENV
s4 DEV DEV DEV DEV
γENV = 0.6
γDEV = 0.3
s1 ENV ENV ENV ENV
s2 FE FE FE FE
s3 ENV ENV ENV ENV
s4 DEV DEV DEV DEV
γENV = 0.4
γDEV = 0.6
s1 FE FE FE FE
s2 FE FE FE FE
s3 FE FE DEV
s4 DEV DEV DEV DEV
γENV = 0.6
γDEV = 0.6
s1 FE FE FE FE
s2 FE FE FE FE
s3 ENV FE FE FE
s4 DEV DEV DEV DEV
developers.
When the DEV’s FST increases, that is, when developers do not see moves as improve-
ments unless they are relatively certain to be better off, they may end up choosing to stay
either at state s1 or s2. This indicates that when environmental agencies are proactive,
developers do not have enough incentive to move away from either of these two states even
though s2 is likely to be preferred to state s1. A move from s1 is not sufficiently likely to
satisfy developers’ desire for improvement. This represents developers’ “stickiness” in mov-
ing to a reachable state implying the likely indifference between states s1 and s2. In this
case, state s3, being an FGMR, FSMR and FSEQ equilibrium, is also a potential resolution
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if both ENV and DEV are farsighted in identifying the benefits of possible moves.
3.7 Summary
A new framework for the GMCR, the FGM, is developed to handle strategic conflicts in
which DMs have fuzzy preferences over the feasible states. This makes it possible to use
all forms of DMs’ preference information—certain or uncertain—in a graph model. Within
FGM, the four basic crisp graph model stability definitions, R, GMR, SMR, and SEQ
for a two-DM graph model are redefined as FR, FGMR, FSMR, and FSEQ, respectively,
and called fuzzy stabilities. The FST, a parameter, is introduced to take into account the
interacting DMs’ satisficing behavior and is incorporated into the fuzzy stability definitions.
When the fuzzy stability definitions developed in this chapter are applied to the well-
known sustainable development conflict, the analysis provides new insights into the dispute.
The predicted equilibria in two different cases of a previous study (developers being less or
more environmentally responsible) are obtained from the same fuzzy preference model. The
analysis also finds that developers’ satisficing behavior has more impact on the solutions
than the satisficing behavior of environmental agencies.
56
Chapter 4
Fuzzy Preferences in an n-Decision
Maker (n > 2) Graph Model
4.1 Introduction
The fuzzy preference framework for the GMCR developed in Chapter 3 is specifically
applicable to a conflict with only two DMs. However, the number of DMs in a real-world
dispute is not limited to two; for example, the Elmira groundwater contamination dispute
has three DMs. To study strategic conflicts with more than two DMs, at least one of whom
has uncertain preferences over feasible states, a general fuzzy preference framework within
the structure of the GMCR is developed in this chapter. More specifically, the concept
of a fuzzy unilateral improvement (FUI) by a coalition of DMs is introduced and the four
basic fuzzy stability definitions—FR, FGMR, FSMR, and FSEQ—for a two-DM case are
extended to an n-DM (n > 2) graph model.
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The fuzzy stability definitions given in Section 3.5 apply only to two-DM graph models.
In such a model, the opponent of a focal DM is an individual. But in a graph model with
more than two DMs, the “opponent” of a focal DM may not be an individual DM but
could be a coalition of two or more DMs. Except for fuzzy Nash stability, the vital issue in
fuzzy stability determination is whether any possible response by the opponent(s) would
constitute a sanction. The fuzzy stability definitions in Section 3.5 apply the criteria
provided by Definition 3.4.1 to identify FUIs from a given state by an individual DM.
Note that the FSEQ stability is defined based on countermoves by the opponent(s) that
are credible in the sense that the opponent(s)’ moves are taken into account only if they
benefit the opponent(s). To facilitate the definition of FSEQ stability for a graph model
with more than two DMs, the definition of an FUI by a coalition of DMs is given in the next
section. Subsequently, fuzzy stability definitions are generalized in the context of an n-DM
(n > 2) graph model, and are presented in Section 4.3. The fuzzy stabilities developed in
Section 4.3 are then applied to the Elmira groundwater contamination dispute—a three-
DM conflict—to demonstrate the applicability of the generalized FGM. Part of the research
in this chapter is based upon the papers by Bashar et al. (2010b,c, 2012b); Hipel et al.
(2011).
4.2 Fuzzy Unilateral Improvements by a Coalition
Definition 3.4.1 provides criteria to identify states that benefit a single DM who is willing
to move to an advantageous state or to make a credible sanctioning move. This case is
clear and straightforward. However, the identification of states that benefit a coalition
of DMs is complicated and depend not only on the FUIs of the coalition members but
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also on their joint unilateral moves and countermoves. The next definition integrates the
idea of a coalitional unilateral move, given by Definition 2.2.2, with the individual FUIs of
Definition 3.4.1.
Definition 4.2.1. (Fuzzy Unilateral Improvements by a Coalition): Let s ∈ S and
H ⊆ N , |H| ≥ 2. Let H = {1, 2, ..., p} and define γH = (γ1, γ2, ..., γp). Now, define the
subset R̃+H,γH (s) ⊆ S inductively by the following:
(1) If k ∈ H and s1 ∈ R̃+k (s), then s1 ∈ R̃
+
H,γH




denotes the set of all last DMs in legal sequences from s to s1;
(2) If s1 ∈ R̃+H,γH (s), k ∈ H, s2 ∈ R̃
+
k (s1), and Ω̃
+
H,γH
(s, s1) 6= {k}, then s2 ∈ R̃+H,γH (s) and
k ∈ Ω̃+H,γH (s, s2).
A fuzzy unilateral improvement (FUI) from s by the coalition H is any member of R̃+H,γH (s).
Note that the induction stops in Definition 4.2.1 as soon as (i) R̃+H,γH (s) cannot be
augmented by any new state, s2, and (ii) |Ω̃+H,γH (s, s1)| cannot be increased beyond 1 for
any s1 ∈ R̃+H,γH (s). As in Definition 2.2.2, Definition 4.2.1 imposes the requirement that all
sequences of moves be legal in the sense that no DM ever moves twice consecutively. Also
note that Definition 4.2.1 depends essentially on the FSTs of all DMs in H, since a new
state s2 is added to R̃
+
H,γH
(s) only if it belongs to R̃+k (s1) = R̃
+
k,γk
(s1) for a suitable s1 and
k. For simplicity, one writes R̃+H(s) = R̃
+
H,γH
(s). It is important to note that if |H| = 1,
such as H = {k}, then R̃+H(s) = R̃
+
k (s).
Remark 4.2.2. When γk = 1.0 for all k ∈ H, that is, when the FST of each DM in the
coalition is 1, the definition of a coalition’s FUI coincides with the definition of a coalition’s
(crisp) UI.
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4.3 Fuzzy Stabilities for an n-Decision Maker (n > 2)
Graph Model
Now that the definition of FUIs from a given initial state by a coalition of DMs in a
graph model with fuzzy preferences is introduced, appropriate fuzzy stabilities for an n-
DM (n > 2) graph model can be defined. Note that fuzzy Nash stability does not depend
on the responses of the opponents, so the definition of fuzzy Nash stability for an n-DM
graph model is unchanged from the two-DM case.
The definitions of the remaining three basic fuzzy stabilities for models with n > 2
DMs and fuzzy preference, namely fuzzy general metarationality, fuzzy symmetric meta-
rationality, and fuzzy sequential stability, are now put forward. In these definitions, N − k
represents the coalition of all DMs other than k or, in other words, k’s opponents. Thus,
RN−k(s) and R̃
+
N−k(s) represent the unilateral moves and FUIs, respectively, from s by
DM k’s opponents.
Definition 4.3.1. (Fuzzy General Metarationality): A state s ∈ S is fuzzy general
metarational (FGMR) for DM k ∈ N if and only if for every s1 ∈ R̃+k (s) there exists an
s2 ∈ RN−k(s1) such that αk(s2, s) < γk.
In FGMR stability, the focal DM inquires whether each of his or her potential FUIs is
sanctioned by the opponents using a coalitional unilateral move, even if this move hurts
any of the opponents. If the focal DM has no FUI from the current state, the state is
automatically FGMR stable in the sense that there is no FUI that cannot be sanctioned
by the opponents using a coalitional unilateral move.
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Definition 4.3.2. (Fuzzy Symmetric Metarationality): A state s ∈ S is fuzzy sym-
metric metarational (FSMR) for DM k ∈ N if and only if for every s1 ∈ R̃+k (s) there exists
an s2 ∈ RN−k(s1) such that αk(s2, s) < γk, and αk(s3, s) < γk for all s3 ∈ Rk(s2).
For FSMR stability, if any of the FUIs of the focal DM is sanctioned by a coalitional
unilateral move of the opponents, the focal DM asks whether he or she can escape the
sanction using a unilateral move. If the focal DM cannot escape the sanction, the current
state is FSMR stable for the DM. For the situation where the focal DM has no FUI from
the current state, the state is FSMR stable in the sense that there is no FUI from the
initial state for which a sanction by the opponents (as a coalition) can be escaped by the
focal DM.
Definition 4.3.3. (Fuzzy Sequential Stability): A state s ∈ S is fuzzy sequentially
stable (FSEQ) for DM k ∈ N if and only if for every s1 ∈ R̃+k (s) there exists an s2 ∈
R̃+N−k(s1) such that α
k(s2, s) < γk.
FSEQ stability is the same as FGMR stability except that while considering the sanc-
tion of each of his or her potential FUIs, the focal DM takes into account only credible
sanctions (i.e., FUIs) by the opponents (as a coalition). If the focal DM has no FUI from
the current state, the state is FSEQ stable in the sense that there is no FUI from the
initial state that cannot be sanctioned by the opponents using a coalitional FUI. Note that
FSEQ stability depends on all DMs’ FSTs because R̃+N−k(s1) appears in this definition.
From above, one can summarize that if there is no FUI from an initial state, the state
is automatically FGMR, FSMR, and FSEQ stable. But by definition, if there is no FUI
from a given state, the state is FR stable. Therefore, it can be concluded that FR stability
implies FGMR, FSMR, and FSEQ stability.
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Definition 4.3.4. (Fuzzy Unstable): A state is fuzzy unstable for a DM under a specific
fuzzy stability definition if the state is not fuzzy stable for that DM under that definition.
Definition 4.3.5. (Fuzzy Equilibrium): A state s ∈ S that is fuzzy stable for all DMs
under a specific fuzzy stability definition is called a fuzzy equilibrium (FE ) under that
definition. In particular, state s is fuzzy Nash equilibrium if s is FR stable for all DMs in
N . Note that the FE corresponding to all the fuzzy stability definitions above, even fuzzy
Nash equilibrium, depend on all DMs’ FSTs.
When the FST of each DM in a graph model is 1.0, the definitions of FR, FGMR,
FSMR, FSEQ, and FE coincide with the definitions of R, GMR, SMR, SEQ, and crisp
equilibrium, respectively. This follows the following theorem.
Theorem 4.3.6. The crisp GMCR is a special case of the FGM.
4.4 Application of Fuzzy Stabilities to the Elmira
Groundwater Contamination Conflict
In this section, the fuzzy stability concept is applied to a real-world environmental conflict
that took place in Elmira, a small town in Ontario, Canada. First, a brief background of
the dispute is presented. Next, the dispute is modelled within the structure of the FGM
followed by a fuzzy stability analysis.
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4.4.1 Background of the Elmira Groundwater Contamination
Conflict
Elmira, a town with about 10,000 residents renowned for its annual maple syrup festi-
val, is located in an agricultural region of southwestern Ontario, Canada, roughly equally
distant from three Great Lakes: Lake Ontario, Lake Erie, and Lake Huron. Domestic
water supplies for the town are sourced mainly from an underground aquifer. In late 1989,
the Ontario Ministry of the Environment (now the Ministry of Environment and Energy),
labeled “M”, found that the aquifer was contaminated by a carcinogen, N-nitroso demethy-
lamine (NDMA), causing a major environmental crisis (Hipel et al., 1993a; Sanderson et
al., 1995; Conestoga-Rovers and Associates, 1999).
NDMA is formed by the combination of nitrates and amines and belongs to the ni-
trosamine group of chemicals. It is highly water soluble and a potent carcinogen. NDMA
was found in two well fields in Elmira at concentrations of 40 ppb and 1.5 ppb (parts per
billion). Although at that time there were no official NDMA drinking water guidelines,
the Ontario Environmental Appeal Board stated in 1992 that concentrations of NDMA
in drinking water should not exceed 0.009 ppb. Suspicion fell on Uniroyal Chemical Ltd.,
called “U”, which since 1942 had been operating a pesticide and rubber products plant in
Elmira that had a history of environmental problems, and was associated with NDMA-
producing processes (Sanderson et al., 1995; Conestoga-Rovers and Associates, 1999).
M issued a control order under the Environmental Protection Act of Ontario, requiring
that U take immediate and expensive measures to rectify the contamination. In reply, U
appealed the control order. The Local Government, labeled “L”, consisting of the Regional
Municipality of Waterloo and the Township of Woolwich, felt that it should take a position
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as the authority responsible for protecting local interests, and sought legal and technical
advice from independent consultants.
4.4.2 A Graph Model of the Elmira Groundwater Contamination
Conflict
The graph model of the Elmira conflict considered here is based on the situation in mid-
1991 (Hipel et al., 1993a). At that time, the control order was still under appeal, and the
situation had not changed for more than one year. The main DMs in the dispute, M, U
and L, each had distinctive objectives. M aimed to carry out what it saw as its mandate
as efficiently as possible, U wanted the control order lifted or at least modified, while L
wanted to protect both its citizens and industrial base.
Table 4.1: Decision Makers, Options, and Feasible States for the Elmira Conflict
M
O1: Modify N Y N Y N Y N Y –
U
O2: Delay Y Y N N Y Y N N –
O3: Accept N N Y Y N N Y Y –
O4: Abandon N N N N N N N N Y
L
O5: Insist N N N N Y Y Y Y –
States s1 s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 s9
To secure a desirable outcome, each DM had one or more options or courses of action.
The DMs, their main options, and feasible states are represented in Table 4.1. The “mod-
ify” option for M means that M could modify the original control order to make it more
favorable to U. As are also listed in the first column of Table 4.1, U could delay the appeal
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process, accept the original control order as is, or simply abandon its operations in Elmira;
and L could insist on the application of the original control order. In Table 4.1, states
are defined by indicating options selected by the controlling DM with “Y” and options
not selected with “N”; the symbol “–” means that the state is the same whether “Y” or
“N” is chosen. Although there are 32 mathematically possible states, only 9 states were
considered feasible due to various option constraints (Fang et al., 1993; Hipel et al., 1993a,
1999; Kilgour et al., 2001). For example, U can select only one option at a time out of the









Figure 4.1: Unilateral Moves in Elmira Conflict
Figure 4.1, the integrated graph for the model of the Elmira conflict in Table 4.1, shows
all unilateral moves. The nodes of the graph represent feasible states and the labels on
the arcs indicate the controlling DM. The arrowhead(s) of an arc indicate the allowable
move directions. Note that the model includes both reversible and irreversible moves; for
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Table 4.2: Preference of the Ontario Ministry of the Environment (M) in the Elmira
Conflict: Most to Least Preferred
s7 s3 s4 s8 s5 s1 s2 s6 s9
example, the move between states s1 and s5 by L is reversible while the move from s1 to
s3 by U is irreversible.
Note that M, a provincial authority that is responsible for environmental issues in the
entire Province of Ontario, might not be as closely connected to the Elmira dispute as
the more local DMs, U and L, and may therefore have more precisely defined preferences.
Hence, the preference of M over the feasible states is assumed to be crisp and shown in
Table 4.2, listed as the most preferred state on the left to the least preferred on the right,
which is identical to (Hipel et al., 1993a, 1999; Kilgour et al., 2001).
But in the present study, possible preference uncertainty of U and L over some states is
taken into account and its effects are assessed. For example, U may be in doubt about the
desirability of abandoning its Elmira operation. More specifically, the preference of U for
state s5, where U delays the appeal process and L insists on the application of the original
control order, over state s9, where U abandons its operation, may be uncertain. Although
L would like to insist on the application of the original control order, it may be uncertain
about its preference when a control order (original or modified) is accepted by U. Thus,
when M modifies the original control order and U accepts it, L may be unsure whether
state s8 (insist) or s4 (not) is better. L may not find enough reason to definitely prefer
state s8 over s4 as assumed in (Hipel et al., 1993a, 1999; Kilgour et al., 2001); rather, it
may lean toward s4 over s8.
Taking these and other possible preference uncertainties of U and L into account, a
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Table 4.3: Fuzzy Preferences of Uniroyal Chemical Ltd. (U) and Local Government (L)
in the Elmira Conflict
RU =











0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0
0 0.5 0.85 0 0.4 0.7 0.9 0 0.2
0 0.15 0.5 0 0 0 0.8 0 0.1
0 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.9
0 0.6 1.0 0 0.5 0.7 1.0 0.1 0.3
0 0.3 1.0 0 0.3 0.5 1.0 0 0.2
0 0.1 0.2 0 0 0 0.5 0 0.05
0 1.0 1.0 0 0.9 1.0 1.0 0.5 0.7
0 0.8 0.9 0.1 0.7 0.8 0.95 0.3 0.5

RL =











0.5 1.0 0 0.8 0 1.0 0 0.7 1.0
0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0
1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.65 1.0 1.0
0.2 1.0 0 0.5 0.25 1.0 0 0.6 1.0
1.0 1.0 0 0.75 0.5 1.0 0 0.7 1.0
0 1.0 0 0 0 0.5 0 0 1.0
1.0 1.0 0.35 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.5 1.0 1.0
0.3 1.0 0 0.4 0.3 1.0 0 0.5 1.0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5

fuzzy preference model for U and L has been developed, as represented by matrices RU
and RL in Table 6.6. For example, the number 0.7 in the 9-th row and 5-th column of RU
represents the degree of preference of state s9 over state s5 for U, while the number 0.6
in the 4-th row and 8-th column of RL represents L’s preference degree for state s4 over
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state s8. To demonstrate how the satisficing behavior of DMs within an FGM influences
fuzzy stabilities, four sets of FSTs of the DMs are considered. The FSTs used in the
analysis are: (i) γM = 1.0, γU = 0.4, γL = 0.2; (ii) γM = 1.0, γU = 0.4, γL = 0.3; (iii)
γM = 1.0, γU = 0.6, γL = 0.2; and (iv) γM = 1.0, γU = 0.6, γL = 0.3. Note that in each case
γM = 1.0, since the preference of M is crisp.
4.4.3 Fuzzy Stability Analysis of the Elmira Groundwater
Contamination Conflict
To carry out a fuzzy stability analysis of the Elmira conflict model described above means
to apply the fuzzy stability definitions in order to identify states with high degrees of
stability. The results are presented in Table 4.4, where a
√
in a cell indicates that the
state in the corresponding row is fuzzy stable for the indicated DM, or a fuzzy equilibrium,
under the indicated fuzzy stability definition. Note that the fuzzy stabilities are calculated
for each of the four sets of FSTs mentioned in Subsection 4.4.2.
As can be seen from Table 4.4, when weaker satisficing criteria for U and L, such as
γU = 0.4 and γL = 0.2, are considered, the two predicted equilibria (states s5 and s8)
of the analysis in (Hipel et al., 1993a, 1999; Kilgour et al., 2001) disappear for FR and
FSEQ stability types. However, there is a new fuzzy equilibrium at state s4. For stronger
satisficing criteria for U and L, that is, for increased FSTs, states s5 and s8 join the fuzzy
equilibrium list. For FSEQ, when moves and countermoves determined using DMs’ FUIs
become relevant, state s1 is no longer fuzzy stable for L when the FST of U is increased.
That is, increasing γU from 0.4 to 0.6 unblocks L’s FUI from s1 to s5, causing state s1 to
be FSEQ unstable for L.
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Table 4.4: Fuzzy Stability Results of the Elmira Groundwater Contamination Conflict
FSTs States
FR FGMR FSMR FSEQ





√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s3
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s5
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s6
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s7
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s8
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s9





√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s3
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s5
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s6
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s7
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s8
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s9





√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s3
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s5
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s6
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s7
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s8
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s9





√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s3
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s5
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s6
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s7
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
s8
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s9
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
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As is clear from Table 4.4, states s4 and s9 have a high degree of stability—they are
FE (fuzzy stable for all DMs) under all four fuzzy stability definitions for each of the four
sets of FSTs. The addition of state s5 to the FE list results from the increase of U’s FST
from 0.4 to 0.6, while the inclusion of state s8 as a FE results from the increase of L’s FST
from 0.2 to 0.3. It should be noted that state s9, where U closes its operation in Elmira, is
the least preferred for both M and L as can be seen from their preference representations.
Moreover, as depicted in Figure 4.1, U alone controls the movement of the dispute to state
s9, which is not its most preferred state, and seems relatively unlikely to happen.
In state s5, U delays the appeal process while L insists on application of the original
control order. In this circumstance, the DMs are working to reach a reasonable (win-win)
resolution, so it seems that, like the original analysis (Hipel et al., 1993a), state s5 cannot
be a likely outcome. State s1, which is similar to state s5 except that L does not insist on
application of the original control order, also cannot be likely. Thus, the alternatives are
state s8, where M modifies the original control order and U accepts it as modified, despite
the objection of L, and state s4, which is the same as state s8 except that L does not raise
any objection.
Thus, if L would move to a reachable state that is relatively less favorable, that is, if
its satisficing criterion is weak, the most reasonable resolution is state s4. However, as L
becomes stricter about making only more favorable moves, that is, if L’s satisficing criterion
is high, the outcome is either state s4 or s8. Note that L controls the movement between
states s4 and s8. Therefore, which of these two equilibria is more likely depends greatly on
how sensitive L is toward U’s interests. Recall that the objective of L was not only to care
for its citizens but also to safeguard its financial base. Furthermore, U controls threats
from states s4 and s8 to abandon its Elmira operation. Thus, L has good reasons to be
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Table 4.5: Comparison of the Stability Results between the Crisp GMCR and FGM
Analyses of the Elmira Groundwater Contamination Conflict
States Stability Results in the Previous Anal-
ysis (using the Crisp GMCR (Hipel et
al., 1993a, 1999; Kilgour et al., 2001))
Stability Findings in the Present Anal-
ysis (using the FGM)
s1 GMR and SMR equilibrium. FGMR, FSMR and FSEQ equilibrium for
each of the four sets of FSTs except that for
larger FST of U, the state becomes FSEQ un-
stable for L.
s4 GMR and SMR equilibrium. FE under all four fuzzy stability definitions
for each of the four sets of FSTs—one of the
recommended resolutions.
s5 Equilibrium under all four stability defini-
tions.
FE under all four fuzzy stability definitions
for only larger FST of U.
s8 Equilibrium under all four stability
definitions—recommended resolution.
FE under all four fuzzy stability definitions for
only larger FST of L. For smaller FST of L,
it is only an FGMR and FSMR equilibrium—
one of the recommended resolutions.
s9 Equilibrium under all four stability defini-
tions.
FE under all four fuzzy stability definitions
for each of the four sets of FSTs—relatively
unlikely to happen.
conciliatory to U. If this is the case, then the most likely resolution is state s4; otherwise,
state s8 would be most likely. The role of L in this model is definitely a new insight into
the conflict; earlier analyses (e.g., (Hipel et al., 1993a)) concluded that, despite its efforts,
L had essentially no effect on the outcome. A comparison of these results with the findings
from the previous crisp graph model analysis of the Elmira groundwater contamination
conflict (Hipel et al., 1993a, 1999; Kilgour et al., 2001) is presented in Table 4.5.
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4.5 Summary
A FGM is developed for the general situation of the n-DM (n > 2) graph model to
incorporate preference uncertainty into conflict decision making. Within this framework,
three basic fuzzy stability definitions—FGMR, FSMR, and FSEQ—are introduced. Since
FR stability does not depend on the responses by the opponents, the FR stability definition
for an n-DM model is the same as for the two-DM case. Moreover, when there are two
DMs in a model (|N | = 2), the fuzzy stabilities given by Definitions 4.3.1, 4.3.2 and 4.3.3
coincide with the Definitions 3.5.2, 3.5.3 and 3.5.4, respectively, since in this case the
coalition H = N − k ⊂ N of the opponents of the focal DM k is trivial. In particular, if
H = N − k = {l}, then RN−k(s) = Rl(s) and R̃+N−k(s) = R̃
+
l (s). Hence, it follows that the
fuzzy stability definitions provided in Section 4.3 constitute a set of fuzzy stability criteria
that can be applied to a graph model with any number of DMs.
When applied to the Elmira groundwater contamination conflict, the fuzzy stability
analysis leads to some different predictions from the original analysis and provides new
insights. The outcomes can be interpreted not only as predictions, but also as answers
to “What-If?” questions. In particular, the final outcome depends on how much L cares
about U’s interests. If L is strict in pursuing its own objectives, the final outcome may be
s8, which does not add any value compared to the other possible outcome, s4, but creates a
gap between these two DMs. On the other hand, if L is more sympathetic to U’s interests,
the outcome may be s4.
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Chapter 5
Coalition Fuzzy Stability Analysis
5.1 Introduction
The fuzzy stability definitions introduced in Sections 3.5 and 4.3 are based solely on the
non-cooperative behavior of DMs; that is, each DM identifies his or her favorable states
based only on his or her own interests. However, in reality, people may cooperate with each
other to see if they can do even better compared to what they can achieve individually.
As mentioned in the Subsection 2.2.6, a coalitional form of stability definitions for
Nash, GMR, SMR, and SEQ within the (crisp) graph model structure are developed in
(Kilgour et al., 2001; Inohara and Hipel, 2008a,b). In this chapter, necessary tools, such
as coalition fuzzy improvements and class coalitional fuzzy improvements, are introduced
to facilitate the coalitional form of fuzzy stability analysis. Next, the four basic coalitional
fuzzy stability definitions, such as coalition fuzzy Nash stability, coalition fuzzy general
metarationality, coalition fuzzy symmetric metarationality, and coalition fuzzy sequential
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stability are developed.
The coalition fuzzy stability definitions introduced in this chapter are applied to a model
of the groundwater contamination dispute in Elmira, described in Section 4.4, demonstrat-
ing how these new concepts can be conveniently applied to practical problems in order to
identify a likely outcome. This application also reveals a comparison between cooperative
and non-cooperative form of fuzzy stabilities, and provides valuable strategic insights. The
research in this chapter was initiated in the paper by Bashar et al. (2012a).
5.2 Fuzzy Improvements by Coalitions
In the fuzzy stability definitions given in Sections 3.5 and 4.3, the focal DM is a single
DM; therefore, to determine states that are advantageous for the DM to move to, one
needs to find the FUI list for each individual DM. However, the coalition fuzzy stabilities
are primarily defined for a coalition of DMs. Note that the concept of a coalition fuzzy
stability is an extension of the notion of a fuzzy stability for an individual DM. Thus, the
coalition fuzzy stabilities will be characterized based on whether a coalition is better off
to stay at the current state or to move to a reachable state. Hence, one needs to identify
states that benefit the members of the coalition.
Recall that H ⊆ N represents a coalition of DMs in N , and P(N), the class of all
coalitions of DMs in N . Also, recall that if H = {1, 2, ..., p} then γH = (γ1, γ2, ..., γp).
Definition 5.2.1. (Coalition Fuzzy Improvement): A state si ∈ S is a coalition
fuzzy improvement (CFI) from a state s ∈ S by a coalition H ⊆ N if si ∈ RH(s) and
αk(si, s) ≥ γk for all k ∈ H.
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Definition 5.2.2. (Coalition Fuzzy Improvement List): The coalition fuzzy improve-
ment list (CFIL) from state s by coalition H is the collection of all CFIs from s by the
coalition H, denoted R̃++H,γH (s).
In summary,
si ∈ R̃++H,γH (s) if and only if si ∈ RH(s) and α
k(si, s) ≥ γk for all k ∈ H.




For coalitional form of FR stability, one needs to identify states from which a coalition
does not have an incentive to move to another state. The criteria given by Definitions 5.2.1
and 5.2.2 are sufficient to find these states. However, to define coalitional forms of FGMR,
FSMR and FSEQ stabilities, one needs to consider possible sanctions by the coalitions
of the opponent DMs. Accordingly, the concept of class coalitional fuzzy improvements
is provided below. Note that the notion of class coalitional moves is given by Definition
2.2.18.
Definition 5.2.3. (Class Coalitional Fuzzy Improvement): Let s ∈ S and C ⊆ P(N).
Let
⋃
H∈C H = {1, 2, ..., η} and define γC = (γ1, γ2, ..., γη). The class fuzzy improvement
list or class coalitional fuzzy improvement list (CCFIL) from state s by class C, denoted
R̃++C,γC(s), is defined inductively as follows:
(1) If H ∈ C and s1 ∈ R̃++H (s), then s1 ∈ R̃
++
C,γC(s).
(2) If s1 ∈ R̃++C,γC(s) and H ∈ C, and s2 ∈ R̃
++
H (s1), then s2 ∈ R̃
++
C,γC(s).
A class coalitional fuzzy improvement (CCFI) from s by the class C is any member of
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R̃++C,γC(s). As in Definition 2.2.18, this definition ensures that no DM in any coalition in C
may move twice consecutively. For simplicity, one writes R̃++C (s) = R̃
++
C,γC(s).
5.3 Coalition Fuzzy Stabilities
Definition 5.3.1. (Coalition Fuzzy Nash Stability or Coalition Fuzzy Rationality
for a Coalition): Let H be a coalition of DMs in N and s ∈ S. State s is coalition fuzzy
Nash stable or coalition fuzzy rational (CFR) for coalition H if and only if R̃++H (s) = ∅.
It is clear from this definition that state s is a CFR for a coalition if and only if there
is no state that is a CFI from s by the coalition. Note that CFR stability is a natural
generalization of the FR stability given in Definition 3.5.1.
Definition 5.3.2. (Coalition Fuzzy Nash Stability or Coalition Fuzzy Rationality
for a DM): Let k ∈ N and s ∈ S. State s is coalition fuzzy Nash stable or coalition fuzzy
rational (CFR) for DM k if and only if s is CFR for all coalitions H ∈ P(N) such that
k ∈ H.
In the following definitions, P(N −H) represents the class of coalitions of DMs in N
other than those in H.
Definition 5.3.3. (Coalition Fuzzy General Metarationality for a Coalition): Let
H ∈ P(N) and s ∈ S. State s is coalition fuzzy general metarational (CFGMR) for
coalition H if and only if for every s1 ∈ R̃++H (s) there exists a CCM s2 ∈ RP(N−H)(s1) such
that αk(s2, s) < γk for some k ∈ H.
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Under CFGMR, each of the initial coalition H’s CFIs is sanctioned by a subsequent
coalitional move by some or all of the sanctioning coalitions such that no DM in any
sanctioning coalition may move twice consecutively. Keep in mind that, as in the case of
CFR stability, CFGMR stability generalizes the concept of FGMR stability provided in
Definition 4.3.1.
Definition 5.3.4. (Coalition Fuzzy General Metarationality for a DM): Let k ∈ N
and s ∈ S. State s is coalition fuzzy general metarational (CFGMR) for DM k if and only
if s is CFGMR for all coalitions H ∈ P(N) such that k ∈ H.
Definition 5.3.5. (Coalition Fuzzy Symmetric Metarationality for a Coalition):
Let H ∈ P(N) and s ∈ S. State s is coalition fuzzy symmetric metarational (CFSMR)
for coalition H if and only if for every s1 ∈ R̃++H (s) there exists a CCM s2 ∈ RP(N−H)(s1)
such that αk(s2, s) < γk for some k ∈ H, and for every s3 ∈ RH(s2), αl(s3, s) < γl for some
l ∈ H.
CFSMR describes the stability of states by looking one more step ahead compared to the
CFGMR by checking whether the initial coalition H can escape sanctions, if any, caused by
the subsequent coalitional moves against each of H’s CFIs. If H cannot escape the sanction
using a coalitional move, the state is CFSMR stable. As before, the CFSMR stability
constitutes an intuitive extension of the FSMR stability furnished in Definition 4.3.2.
Definition 5.3.6. (Coalition Fuzzy Symmetric Metarationality for a DM): Let
k ∈ N and s ∈ S. State s is coalition fuzzy symmetric metarational (CFSMR) for DM k
if and only if s is CFSMR for all coalitions H ∈ P(N) such that k ∈ H.
Definition 5.3.7. (Coalition Fuzzy Sequential Stability for a Coalition): Let H ∈
P(N) and s ∈ S. State s is coalition fuzzy sequentially stable (CFSEQ) for coalition H
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if and only if for every s1 ∈ R̃++H (s) there exists a CCFI s2 ∈ R̃
++
P(N−H)(s1) such that
αk(s2, s) < γk for some k ∈ H.
CFSEQ is the same as CFGMR except that while considering sanctions of the initial
coalition H’s CFIs, H takes into account only subsequent coalitional fuzzy improvements
rather than coalitional moves. Like other coalition fuzzy stabilities, CFSEQ stability is a
natural generalization of the FSEQ stability given in Definition 4.3.3.
Definition 5.3.8. (Coalition Fuzzy Sequential Stability for a DM): Let k ∈ N and
s ∈ S. State s is coalition fuzzy sequentially stable (CFSEQ) for DM k if and only if s is
CFSEQ for all coalitions H ∈ P(N) such that k ∈ H.
Definition 5.3.9. (Coalition Fuzzy Equilibrium): A state s ∈ S is a coalition fuzzy
equilibrium (CFE ) under a specific coalition fuzzy stability concept if and only if s is
coalition fuzzy stable for all DMs under that coalition fuzzy stability notion. For instance,
state s is coalition fuzzy Nash equilibrium or CFR equilibrium if and only if it is CFR
stable for all DMs in N .
Remark 5.3.10. If the FST of each DM in N is 1.0, the definitions of coalition fuzzy
stabilities and associated coalition fuzzy equilibrium developed in this section coincide with
the definitions of the corresponding coalition stabilities and associated coalition equilibrium
provided in Subsection 2.2.6.
The following theorem is due to Remark 5.3.10.
Theorem 5.3.11. Coalition fuzzy stability concepts of the FGM are generalizations of
(crisp) coalition stability notions of the GMCR.
78
5.4 Application of Coalition Fuzzy Stabilities to the
Elmira Groundwater Contamination Conflict
To clearly understand the coalition fuzzy stability concepts as well as the associated def-
initions, and to demonstrate how they can be applied to practical decision problems, the
methodology is applied to an actual dispute over the contamination of the groundwater
aquifer supplying the town of Elmira, Canada, which is described in detail in Section 4.4.
Note that a crisp graph model coalition analysis of the Elmira conflict was initiated by
Kilgour et al. (2001) while an extensive coalition analysis was done by Inohara and Hipel
(2008a).
To study the impacts of DMs’ satisficing behavior in the coalition fuzzy stability analysis
of the Elmira dispute, four sets of FSTs—(i) γM = 1.0, γU = 0.4, γL = 0.2; (ii) γM =
1.0, γU = 0.4, γL = 0.3; (iii) γM = 1.0, γU = 0.6, γL = 0.2; and (iv) γM = 1.0, γU = 0.6, γL =
0.3—are considered, which are the same as in Section 4.4. The reason for choosing the
same set of FSTs as in Section 4.4 is to compare the outcomes of the present analysis with
the results obtained in Section 4.4 using non-cooperative fuzzy stabilities.
Recall that the set of DMs in the conflict is N = {M, U, L} and the set of feasible
states, S = {s1, s2, ..., s9}. Hence, all possible coalitions of DMs are {M}, {U}, {L}, {M,
U}, {M, L}, {U, L}, and {M, U, L}. For simplicity, these coalitions are written as M, U, L,
MU, ML, UL, and MUL, respectively; hence P(N) = {M, U, L, MU, ML, UL, MUL}. The
reachable lists for all coalitions of DMs are calculated by using Definition 2.2.2, and are
presented in Table 5.1. Next, for each coalition H ∈ P(N), Definitions 5.2.2 and 5.2.3 are
employed to calculate CFILs R̃++H (s) and CCFILs R̃
++
P(N−H)(s), respectively, from each state




Table 5.1: Reachable Lists of Coalitions
States
(s)
Reachable Lists RH(s) by Coalitions H ⊆ N
M U L MU ML UL MUL
s1 s2 s3, s9 s5 s2, s3, s4, s9 s2, s5, s6 s3, s5, s7, s9 s2, s3, s4, s5, s6, s7, s8, s9
s2 s4, s9 s6 s4, s9 s6 s4, s6, s8, s9 s4, s6, s8, s9
s3 s4 s9 s7 s4, s9 s4, s7, s8 s7, s9 s4, s7, s8, s9
s4 s9 s8 s9 s8 s8, s9 s8, s9
s5 s6 s7, s9 s1 s6, s7, s8, s9 s1, s2, s6 s1, s3, s7, s9 s1, s2, s3, s4, s6, s7, s8, s9
s6 s8, s9 s2 s8, s9 s2 s2, s4, s8, s9 s2, s4, s8, s9
s7 s8 s9 s3 s8, s9 s3, s4, s8 s3, s9 s3, s4, s8, s9
s8 s9 s4 s9 s4 s4, s9 s4, s9
s9
presented in Tables 5.2 and 5.3, respectively, for only the FSTs γM = 1.0, γU = 0.4, and
γL = 0.2. In particular, one can see from Table 5.2 that state s8 is a CFI of coalition MU
from state s5, since s8 ∈ RMU(s5), and αM(s8, s5) = 1.0 − 0 = 1.0 = γM and αU(s8, s5) =
0.9− 0.1 = 0.8 > 0.4 = γU. From Table 5.3, state s9 is a CCFI from state s1 by the class
of coalitions of the opponents of M (that is, of the class of coalitions {U, L, UL}), since s9
is a CFI from state s5 by U and s5 is a CFI from state s1 by L.
Although four different coalition fuzzy stability definitions are introduced to include
varied human behavior under conflict within the FGM, it is reasonable to assume that
CFR and CFSEQ stability represent a majority of the DMs’ behavioral patterns, since DMs
levying sanctions will not hurt themselves when sanctioning by moving to a less preferred
state. Hence, a coalition fuzzy stability analysis for CFR and CFSEQ are presented here
for the dispute over the groundwater contamination in Elmira. Note from Definitions 5.3.2,
5.3.4, 5.3.6, and 5.3.8 that the coalition fuzzy stability for an individual DM depends on
the coalition fuzzy stability results for all possible coalitions in which that DM is a member.
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Table 5.2: Coalition Fuzzy Improvement Lists for Fuzzy Satisficing Thresholds (FSTs):
γM = 1.0, γU = 0.4, γL = 0.2
States
(s)
Coalition Fuzzy Improvement Lists R̃++H (s) for Coalitions H ⊆ N
M U L MU ML UL MUL
s1 s5 s5




s6 s8, s9 s8 s4, s8 s4, s8
s7 s9 s3 s3
s8 s4 s4 s4 s4
s9
Table 5.3: Class Coalitional Fuzzy Improvement Lists for Fuzzy Satisficing Thresholds
(FSTs): γM = 1.0, γU = 0.4, γL = 0.2
States
(s)
Class Coalitional Fuzzy Improvement Lists R̃++P(N−H)(s) for Coalitions H ⊆ N
M U L MU ML UL MUL
s1 s5, s9 s5 s5
s2 s4, s6, s8, s9 s6 s4, s9 s6 s4, s9
s3 s9 s9 s9
s4
s5 s9 s8, s9 s9
s6 s4, s8, s9 s8, s9 s8, s9
s7 s3, s9 s3 s9 s3 s9
s8 s4 s4 s4
s9
In particular, in the Elmira conflict, a state is CFR stable for DM M if it is CFR stable
for coalitions M, MU, ML, and MUL. The CFR and CFSEQ stability results for DM M
for FSTs γM = 1.0, γU = 0.4, andγL = 0.2 are presented in Table 5.4. One can notice from
Table 5.4 that state s4 is CFR for DM M since it is CFR for each of the four coalitions
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M, MU, ML and MUL, while state s5 is not CFR for DM M because it is not CFR for
coalition MU, although it is for the other three coalitions M, ML and MUL.
Table 5.4: Coalition Fuzzy Nash (CFR) and Sequential (CFSEQ) Stability Results for
the Ontario Ministry of the Environment (M) for Fuzzy Satisficing Thresholds (FSTs):
γM = 1.0, γU = 0.4, γL = 0.2
States
(s)
CFR for Coalition H ⊆ N CFR for
DM M
CFSEQ for Coalition H ⊆ N CFSEQ
for DM MM MU ML MUL M MU ML MUL
s1
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s2
√ √ √ √
s3
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s4
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s5
√ √ √ √ √ √
s6
√ √ √ √
s7
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s8
√ √ √ √
s9
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
The overall stability results, that is, the CFR and CFSEQ stability findings for M,
U and L as well as the corresponding CFE for all four sets of FSTs, are presented in
Table 5.5. It can be seen from Table 5.5 that the most consistent CFE are states s4 and
s9, as they appear to be CFE under both CFR and CFSEQ stability concepts for all four
sets of FSTs. If L requires more certainty of improvements, that is, if L wants to gain
more in identifying its FUIs, then state s8 joins the CFE list. Notice that for smaller FST
of U, state s1 is not CFE under CFR but it is under CFSEQ. The reason for this is that
there is a CFI s5 from state s1 by each of the coalitions L and ML that is sanctioned by
the subsequent CCFI(s) of the class of coalitions of the opponents of each of L and ML.
In particular, the CFI s5 of coalition ML from s1 is sanctioned by the subsequent CCFI
s9 of the class {U} of coalitions of the opponent(s) of ML, making state s1 to be CFSEQ
82
stable for ML. However, for increased FST of U, CFI s5 from s1 by coalition ML becomes
unsanctioned, so that s1 can no longer be CFE under CFSEQ.
Now, these findings can be compared with the non-cooperative form of fuzzy stability
results of the Elmira conflict found in Section 4.4 (given in Table 4.4). For this purpose,
Table 5.6 is reproduced from Table 4.4, representing only FR and FSEQ stability results.
From Tables 5.5 and 5.6, one can find that, the non-cooperative form of FE state s5 is no
longer a FE when DMs coordinate their moves. This is because the coalition MU has a
CFI s8 from s5 that cannot be sanctioned by any subsequent CCFI of the class of coalitions
of the opponents of MU. Hence, state s5 is not CFR or CFSEQ stable for any of the DMs
M and U. This means that M and U can find a better outcome than s5 if they form a
coalition; accordingly, s5 is not a good choice as a resolution. Thus, the coalition fuzzy
stability analysis can help narrow down the list of possible resolution(s).
Although there are no other differences between the FE and CFE results, there is a
substantial amount of difference in individual level fuzzy stability findings between the
non-cooperative and coalitional fuzzy stability concepts. For example, when considering
the non-cooperative form, M does not envision an FUI from any of the states, thereby
making each feasible state FR as well as FSEQ stable. However, if it decides to cooperate
with others, some states become fuzzy stable, but not all. For instance, for FSTs γM =
1.0, γU = 0.4, and γL = 0.2, states s1, s3, s4, s7, ands9 are CFSEQ stable for M. This means
that M can join in some coalitions for each of which there are some CFIs that cannot
be sanctioned by any subsequent CCFIs of the class of coalitions of the opponents of the
initial coalition. Hence, M now has a shorter list of states from which it cannot do any
better. This fact is very important to come up with a suitable resolution. Even if this does
not change the equilibrium list at this time, the DM may reconsider its preferences to see
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√ √ √ √ √
s2
s3
√ √ √ √
s4













√ √ √ √ √
s2
s3
√ √ √ √
s4







√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s9








√ √ √ √
s4
















√ √ √ √
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√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s9
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
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Table 5.6: Non-cooperative Form of Fuzzy Nash (FR) and Sequential (FSEQ) Stability
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√ √ √ √
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√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s5
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
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√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
s9
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
85
how outcomes are influenced.
Table 5.7: Evolution from the Status Quo State to the Coalition Fuzzy Equilibrium
(CFE ), s4, in the Elmira Conflict (when γL = 0.2)
Status Quo Intermediate Cooperative Moves CFE
M
1. Modify N N −→ Y Y
U
2. Delay Y Y −→ N N
3. Accept N N −→ Y Y
4. Abandon N N N N
L
5. Insist N −→ Y Y −→ N
States s1 s5 s8 s4
Table 5.8: Evolution from the Status Quo State to the Coalition Fuzzy Equilibrium
(CFE ), s8, in the Elmira Conflict (when γL = 0.3)
Status Quo Intermediate Cooperative Moves CFE
M
1. Modify N N −→ Y
U
2. Delay Y Y −→ N
3. Accept N N −→ Y
4. Abandon N N N
L
5. Insist N −→ Y Y
States s1 s5 s8
From Table 5.5, one can see that any of states s4, s8 and s9 can be a final resolution.
From Table 5.2, states s4 and s8 can only be CFIs if all three DMs join in a coalition.
Because the final outcome should to be a state that is favorable to all DMs, state s9
cannot be a suitable choice. If the status quo state is considered to be s1, L can take the
conflict from s1 to s5, which is an FUI for L. Then, the coalition MU can take the conflict
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from state s5 to s8, which is a coalitional fuzzy improvement. If the FST of L is small such
that a move is not highly restricted, it can join the coalition MU to make the final move
from state s8 to s4, which is a CFI for the coalition MUL, and hence, the final outcome
will be s4. If L is too strict to make a move, then s8 will remain as the final outcome. The
possible evolutions of this conflict from the status quo state s1 to the CFE states s4 and
s8 are exhibited in Tables 5.7 and 5.8, respectively.
5.5 Summary
The coalition fuzzy stability definitions for Nash, general metarational, symmetric metara-
tional, and sequential stability concepts of the GMCR are developed so that they constitute
a natural generalization of the individual level FR, FGMR, FSMR and FSEQ stabilities.
By employing these definitions, each state can be investigated for not only how preferable
it is for an individual DM, but also how desirable it is for the DM as a potential coalition
member. Specifically, coalition fuzzy stability for a DM identifies states from which neither
the DM himself or herself, nor any of the coalitions that he or she can join, would like to
move away. A DM can first assess how well he or she can do by acting on his own and then
ascertain whether he can fare even better by cooperating within a coalition in the face of
high uncertainty.
When applied to the Elmira groundwater contamination conflict, the methodology iden-
tifies some states that were fuzzy stable for M with respect to the non-cooperative fuzzy
stability definitions developed in Chapters 3 and 4, but fail to be coalition fuzzy stable for
DM M. Hence, the coalition fuzzy stability analysis may narrow down the list of individual-
level fuzzy stabilities, thereby providing the analyst with valuable strategic insights into
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the conflict under study. Furthermore, the possible evolution of a conflict from a status
quo state to a final outcome can be conveniently explained using CFILs. Therefore, as an
analysis tool to augment non-cooperative fuzzy stabilities, coalition fuzzy stability analysis





In any decision making technique, DMs’ preference information, expressed implicitly or
explicitly, is an essential component. Preference information may be given in various forms,
for instance as utilities (as in classical game theory (von Neumann and Morgenstern, 1944)),
as fuzzy utilities (as in fuzzy decision making (Nakamura, 1986; De Wilde, 2004)), via crisp
option prioritization (as in the crisp GMCR (Hipel et al., 1997; Peng et al., 1997; Peng,
1999; Hipel et al., 2001; Fang et al., 2003)), or simply as pairwise relative preferences over
the feasible states or scenarios (as in the GMCR (Kilgour et al., 1987; Fang et al., 1993)).
In whatever form a DM’s preference information is provided, the objective is always to
represent a preference relation over the feasible states or alternatives.
Crisp option prioritization is a methodology to model a DM’s preference over feasible
states within a graph model structure using his or her priority list of combinations of
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courses of action, referred to as preference statements (Peng et al., 1997; Peng, 1999; Fang
et al., 2003). To be more specific, a DM’s preference statements are composed of options
using logical connectives such as “and”, “or”, and “if–then”, and listed from the most
important to least. The option prioritization methodology takes into account the truth
value (“true” or “false”) of each preference statement at each feasible state. Note that in
calculating a DM’s preferences, a more important preference statement dominates a less
important one, and the truthfulness of a preference statement dominates its falsity. For
example, in the Elmira model, the most important preference statement of L is “U does not
close its operations in Elmira”; so any state or scenario in which U continues its operations
in Elmira is preferred by L to any state in which U closes its operations.
Note that the FGM developed in Chapters 3 and 4, extending the crisp GMCR, as well
as the coalition fuzzy stabilities introduced in Chapter 5, take into account a DM’s fuzzy
preferences. But, like crisp preferences, modeling fuzzy preferences by pairwise comparison
of states is difficult, and even impractical, for larger problems. Until now, there is no
single procedure to model a DM’s fuzzy preference within a graph model framework. In
this chapter, a fuzzy version of the crisp graph model option prioritization methodology,
called fuzzy option prioritization, is developed by assuming fuzzy truth values of preference
statements at feasible states to model DMs’ fuzzy preferences for use in the analysis step
of the FGM. The original research carried out in this chapter is the extension of the paper
by Bashar et al. (2012c).
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6.2 Fuzzy Truth Values and Fuzzy Scores
Preference uncertainty is an important issue in modeling and analyzing a real-world deci-
sion problem. When preference uncertainty is incurred in a multiple participant-multiple
objective decision problem, preference statements, as modeled for the crisp option prior-
itization technique, developed in (Peng et al., 1997; Peng, 1999; Fang et al., 2003) and
described in Subsection 2.2.7, may not be assessed to be precisely “true” or “false” at
some feasible states. Note that an earlier version of crisp option prioritization was first
introduced by Fraser and Hipel (1988), discussed by Fraser (1993, 1994), and then gener-
alized for use within GMCR by Peng et al. (1997); Peng (1999); Hipel et al. (1997); Fang
et al. (2003).
A limitation of preference modeling by crisp option prioritization technique is that it
assesses a preference statement based only on whether it occurs (i.e., “true”) or not (i.e.,
“false”) at a state, and does not consider other courses of action that are present in that
state but not included in that particular preference statement. These courses of action may
influence the truth value of the preference statement at that state. For example, in the
Elmira dispute, L may consider the preference statement “insisting on the application of
the original control order” in modeling its preferences. It may be reasonable to restrict the
truth value of this preference statement to either “true” or “false” at states in which U is
delaying the appeal process. However, at a state in which U accepts a control order (original
or modified), the truth value of this preference statement may not be precisely “true” or
“false”. Accordingly, to make the crisp option prioritization a more useful preference
elicitation technique, a more flexible and realistic truth value of a preference statement is
needed.
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In the circumstances described above, it may be reasonable to represent the truth value
of a preference statement at a state by a numerical value taken from the closed unit interval
[0, 1], referred to as a truth degree or degree of truth, called a fuzzy truth value. A truth
degree of 1 for a preference statement at a state indicates that the preference statement
is true, while a truth degree of 0 implies that the preference statement is false. Note that
fuzzy truth value is the main concept behind fuzzy logic and fuzzy set, introduced by Zadeh
(1965), that has a wide variety of applications in engineering, decision sciences, and other
areas (Bellman and Zadeh, 1970; Bojadziev and Bojadziev, 2007; Ross, 2010).
A lower truth degree of a preference statement at a particular state indicates less
suitability, while a higher truth degree implies more suitability of the statement in the
circumstances of the state. If σt(s) = σ(Ωt, s) denotes the fuzzy truth value of a preference
statement Ωt at a given state s ∈ S, then σt(s) = 0 (that is, the truth degree of the
preference statement Ωt at state s is 0) means that the statement Ωt does not make any
sense at s, which is equivalent to the fact that Ωt is “false” at s, that is, Ωt(s) = F .
Likewise, σt(s) = 1 is equivalent to Ωt(s) = T .
Recall from Subsection 2.2.7 that Ω1,Ω2, ...,Ωq represent a DM’s preference statements
listed in order of importance from most to least. For 1 ≤ t ≤ q, let Ψ̃t(s) denote the fuzzy











In (6.2), the fuzzy truth values of preference statements at the feasible states, as assumed
for preference uncertainty, are taken into account to calculate fuzzy scores for the states.
The fuzzy scores of the feasible states will be used in a formula, developed in the following
section, to calculate a preference degree for each pair of states.
6.3 Fuzzy Preference Elicitation
The crisp option prioritization, representing a crisp preference ordering of feasible states
for a DM lexicographically or by using the scores calculated by employing the Equation
2.3, is a standard ranking methodology if there is no preference uncertainty and the states
are assessed according to the preference statements of the DM using Boolean or classical
logic. However, because preference uncertainty is the main justification for the assumption
of fuzzy truth values in the assessment of preference statements at feasible states, the crisp
preference ordering of states using the fuzzy scores as given by (6.2) is not enough to capture
the vagueness in preferences. Rather, the cardinal values of the fuzzy scores should be used
to identify the preference intensity between two states. A function r : S × S −→ [0, 1] is









, if Ψ̃(si) 6= Ψ̃(sj)
0.5, otherwise,
(6.3)
where for an s ∈ S, Ψ(s) and Ψ̃(s) are defined by (2.3) and (6.2), respectively. The following
theorem establishes that the function defined by (6.3) represents a fuzzy preference relation
over the set of feasible states, S.
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Theorem 6.3.1. The fuzzy relation R = (rij)m×m on S, with membership function
µR : S × S −→ [0, 1]
defined by µR(si, sj) = rij = r(si, sj), where r(si, sj) is given by (6.3), is a fuzzy preference
relation on S.
Proof: First we show that for any si, sj ∈ S, µR(si, sj) = rij = r(si, sj) ∈ [0, 1].
Let si, sj ∈ S. If Ψ̃(si) = Ψ̃(sj), then by (6.3), r(si, sj) = 0.5. If Ψ̃(si) 6= Ψ̃(sj), then from
the fact that
| Ψ̃(si)− Ψ̃(sj) | ≤ max{| Ψ(si)−Ψ(sj) |, | Ψ̃(si)− Ψ̃(sj) |},
we obtain
−1 ≤ Ψ̃(si)− Ψ̃(sj)









max{| Ψ(si)−Ψ(sj) |, | Ψ̃(si)− Ψ̃(sj) |}
≤ 1,
that is, 0 ≤ r(si, sj) ≤ 1. Accordingly, µR(si, sj) = rij = r(si, sj) ∈ [0, 1], for all si, sj ∈ S.
Next we show that µR(si, sj)+µR(sj, si) = 1, for any si, sj ∈ S. For si, sj ∈ S for which
Ψ̃(si) = Ψ̃(sj), the above identity is obvious, since in this case r(si, sj) = r(sj, si) = 0.5,
and hence, µR(si, sj) = µR(sj, si) = 0.5. For si, sj ∈ S satisfying Ψ̃(si) 6= Ψ̃(sj), we obtain
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that















Finally, µR(si, si) = rii = r(si, si) = 0.5, from (6.3). Hence, R = (rij)m×m is a fuzzy
preference relation on S.
Theorem 6.3.2. Crisp option prioritization is a special case of fuzzy option prioritiza-
tion. Specifically, if the truth value of each preference statement at each feasible state is
based on Boolean logic, then preferences over feasible states obtained by employing fuzzy
option prioritization are crisp and are the same as would be found by using crisp option
prioritization.
Proof: Assume that the truth value of each preference statement Ωt, t = 1, 2, ..., q, at
each state in S is based on Boolean logic. Then for any s ∈ S,
σt(s) =












For si, sj ∈ S, by crisp option prioritization, si  sj, or si ∼ sj, or si ≺ sj if and only
if Ψ(si) > Ψ(sj), or Ψ(si) = Ψ(sj), or Ψ(si) < Ψ(sj), respectively. Now, if Ψ(si) > Ψ(sj),
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which is equivalent to si  sj.
If Ψ(si) = Ψ(sj), then by (6.3), r(si, sj) = 0.5, which is equivalent to si ∼ sj. Finally,













which is equivalent to si ≺ sj. This completes the proof.
6.4 Application of Fuzzy Option Prioritization to the
Elmira Groundwater Contamination Conflict
To demonstrate how the fuzzy option prioritization methodology can be employed to model
fuzzy preferences in a real-world multiple participant-multiple objective decision problem,
it is applied to the Elmira groundwater contamination conflict described in Section 4.4.
Recall from Section 4.4 that in Elmira dispute, the uncertain preferences of U and L were
modeled as fuzzy preferences by complicated and time consuming pairwise comparison of
states, represented in Table 6.6 by matrices RU and RL, respectively. In this section, the
uncertain preferences of U and L are modeled as fuzzy preferences by using the systematic
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Table 6.1: Lexicographic Preference Statements and Interpretations for the Ontario
Ministry of the Environment (M) in the Elmira Conflict
Preference Statement Interpretation
−O4 Concerned about the provincial economy, M does not want U to abandon
its operations in Elmira.
O3 M wants U to accept a control order, original or modified.
−O2 M does not want the procedure delayed.
−O1 M prefers that the original control order not be modified.
O5 IFF −O1 M would like L to support the original control order if and only if it does
not modify the order.
fuzzy option prioritization technique developed in this chapter. The methodology also
generates a crisp preference for M as expected.
Peng (1999) developed a set of preference statements for each of the DMs, M, U and
L, of the Elmira dispute to apply the crisp option prioritization for eliciting preferences.
In this study, the preference statements of M, U and L are considered to be the same as in
(Peng, 1999), which are presented in Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, respectively. In these tables,
preference statements are listed vertically from most to least important. Recall that crisp
option prioritization (Fang et al., 2003; Peng et al., 1997; Peng, 1999) is a methodology that
is used to order feasible states lexicographically based on truth values, “true” or “false”,
of preference statements at each state.
Unlike Peng’s assumption in (Peng, 1999), the truth values of some of the preference
statements of U and L at some states may not be concluded as exactly “true” or “false”
because of the presence of some specific combinations of courses of actions in those states.
For Example, according to Boolean logic, the truth value of U’s preference statement Ω2
(−O4, meaning that U prefers not to abandon its operations in Elmira) is “true” at state
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Table 6.2: Lexicographic Preference Statements and Interpretations for Uniroyal
Chemical Ltd. (U) in the Elmira Conflict
Preference Statement Interpretation
O3 IFF O1 U would accept the control order if and only if it is modified.
−O4 U does not want to abandon its operations in Elmira.
−O5 U does not want L to insist on the application of the original control
order.
O2 IFF −O5 U would like to delay the procedure if and only if L’s attitude is softened.
Table 6.3: Lexicographic Preference Statements and Interpretations for Local
Government (L) in the Elmira Conflict
Preference Statement Interpretation
−O4 Concerned about the negative impacts on local economy, L does not
want U to abandon its operations in Elmira.
−O1 L prefers that the original control order not be modified.
O3 IF −O1 L wants U to accept the control order if it is not modified.
O5 IF O1 L would insistently ask for the original control order if M plans to modify
it.
−O2 L does not want the procedure delayed.
O5 L insists on the application of the original control order.
s3 in which U accepts the original control order. However, when U has to accept the
original control order, it may not prefer to choose “not abandon” with 100% truth (that is,
a degree of truth 1), even if it would rather not abandon; instead, it may prefer to choose
“not abandon” with some degree of truth between 0 and 1. A similar argument may be
given for L when judging truthfulness of the preference statement Ω6 (O5, meaning that L
tends to insist on the application of the original control order in any circumstances) at state
s4, where a modified control order is accepted by U without pressure from L. Specifically,
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if M modifies the original control order and U accepts it, as described by state s4, L may
take into account U’s possible threat of abandoning its operations in Elmira, and prefer to
assign a non-zero truth degree to Ω6 at s4, rather than a truth value of “false” (equivalent
to a truth degree of 0) in accordance with Boolean logic.
The above circumstances necessitate the consideration of fuzzy truth values of some
preference statements at some states to calibrate preferences of U and L in the Elmira
conflict. By taking these and similar situations into account, fuzzy truth values are assigned
to the preference statements of U and L at each feasible state, which are presented in Table
6.4. Recall that a truth degree of 1 indicates the absolute truth of a preference statement
(which is equivalent to the truth value “true”), while a truth degree of 0 means the absolute
falsity (equivalent to the truth value “false”). As is also explained in Section 4.4, M is a
provincial authority that looks after the environmental issues of the entire Province of
Ontario. Its interest regarding the Elmira conflict may not be as closely connected to the
dispute as the more local DMs, U and L, and may therefore be considered to have precisely
defined preferences. Hence, by examining the preference statements listed in Table 6.1,
one can ascertain that the truth value of each of these statements at each feasible state is
Boolean logic-based, “true” or “false”, which is also presented in Table 6.4.
In Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3, there are a total of 5, 4 and 6 preference statements for M,
U and L, respectively. Since there is exactly one truth degree for one preference statement
at a given state, M, U and L have 5, 4 and 6 truth degrees, respectively, at each state. The
first, second and third columns of Table 6.4 list these truth degrees as 5-tuples, 4-tuples
and 6-tuples, respectively, in which the truth degrees appear in the decreasing order of
importance of the preference statements. That is, the first entry of a 4-tuple represents
the truth degree of the most important preference statement of U at a state, while the last
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entry is the truth degree of the least important preference statement. For example, in the
4-tuple (0, 0.7, 1, 0) in the third row and third column of Table 6.4, the first entry 0 is the
truth degree of the most important preference statement “O3 IFF O1” of U at state s3, the
second entry 0.7 is the truth degree of the second most important preference statement
“−O4”, and so on.
Table 6.4: Fuzzy Truth Values of the Preference Statements of the Ontario Ministry of




Fuzzy Truth Values of Preference Statements (Most Important to Least) at State s
M U L
s1 (1, 0, 0, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1, 1) (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 0)
s2 (1, 0, 0, 0, 1) (0.25, 1, 1, 1) (1, 0, 1, 0, 0, 0)
s3 (1, 1, 1, 1, 0) (0, 0.7, 1, 0) (1, 1, 1, 1, 1, 0.5)
s4 (1, 1, 1, 0, 1) (1, 1, 1, 0) (1, 0.2, 1, 0.7, 1, 0.7)
s5 (1, 0, 0, 1, 1) (1, 0.65, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0, 1, 0, 1)
s6 (1, 0, 0, 0, 0) (0.25, 1, 0.4, 0.5) (1, 0, 1, 1, 0, 1)
s7 (1, 1, 1, 1, 1) (0, 0.7, 0, 1) (1, 1, 1, 0.9, 1, 0.5)
s8 (1, 1, 1, 0, 0) (1, 1, 0, 1) (1, 0.2, 1, 0.5, 1, 0.5)
s9 (0, 0, 1, 1, 0) (1, 0.35, 1, 0) (0, 1, 0, 1, 1, 0)
Now one employs Equation 6.2 to calculate a fuzzy score for each state in S for M, U
and L. Next, these fuzzy scores are used in (6.3) to find the fuzzy preference degrees for M,
U and L. From the results, it is clear that the preferences of M are crisp, represented by
Table 6.5 from most preferred on the left to least preferred on the right, and are the same
as found in (Peng, 1999), because the truth values of the preference statements of M at
feasible states are assumed to be Boolean. This same preferences of M are also considered
in the fuzzy stability analysis of the Elmira dispute in Section 4.4 as well as in the coalition
fuzzy stability analysis in Section 5.4. However, the application of Equation 6.3 generates
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Table 6.5: Preferences of the Ontario Ministry of the Environment (M) in the Elmira
Conflict: Most to Least Preferred
s7 s3 s4 s8 s5 s1 s2 s6 s9
Table 6.6: Fuzzy Preferences of Uniroyal Chemical Ltd. (U) and Local Government (L)
in the Elmira Conflict
RU =











0.5 0.875 1.0 1.0 1.0 0.85 1.0 1.0 0.86
0.125 0.5 1.0 0.1429 0.34 0.7833 1.0 0.1667 0.1
0 0 0.5 0 0.0167 0 1.0 0 0
0 0.8571 1.0 0.5 1.0 0.835 1.0 1.0 0.825
0 0.66 0.9833 0 0.5 0.7063 0.9857 0 0.3
0.15 0.2167 1.0 0.165 0.2938 0.5 1.0 0.1833 0.1583
0 0 0 0 0.0143 0 0.5 0 0
0 0.8333 1.0 0 1.0 0.8167 1.0 0.5 0.7667
0.14 0.9 1.0 0.175 0.7 0.8417 1.0 0.2333 0.5

RL =











0.5 1.0 0 0.665 0 1.0 0.0409 0.93 1.0
0 0.5 0 0 0 0 0.0196 0 1.0
1.0 1.0 0.5 0.845 1.0 1.0 0.7 0.9933 1.0
0.335 1.0 0.155 0.5 0.3045 1.0 0.181 0.6 1.0
1.0 1.0 0 0.6955 0.5 1.0 0.045 0.9417 1.0
0 1.0 0 0 0 0.5 0.025 0 1.0
0.9591 0.9804 0.3 0.819 0.955 0.975 0.5 0.95 0.989
0.07 1.0 0.0067 0.4 0.0583 1.0 0.05 0.5 1.0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0.011 0 0.5

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fuzzy preferences for U and L as preference degrees for one state over another, which are
represented by matrices RU and RL in Table 6.6.
As is also mentioned earlier, fuzzy preferences of U and L are modeled in Section 4.4 as
matrices RU and RL by pairwise comparison of feasible states for use in the fuzzy stability
analysis of the Elmira dispute. One can verify that the fuzzy preferences RU and RL, as
obtained here, are very close to RU and RL, respectively. In particular, with the same
sets of FSTs, as considered in Section 4.4, fuzzy stability results are also the same. As the
objective of this chapter is to develop an efficient technique to model fuzzy preferences of
DMs involved in a dispute and not to make an analysis, the details of the fuzzy stability
results are not shown here.
It may be mentioned that it was hard to model the fuzzy preferences of U and L in
Section 4.4 by comparing the states pairwise. However, the fuzzy option prioritization
methodology developed in this chapter can do this job without difficulty, and the fuzzy
preference outputs are very close to those obtained by a pairwise comparison of states. It
follows that the new methodology can utilize human judgements on preference statements
at feasible states efficiently and generate a fuzzy preference that is reasonably close to the
one obtained by systematic but tedious pairwise comparison of states. Since the truth
values of preference statements of M at feasible states are all based on Boolean logic, the
methodology provides a crisp preference ordering of states for M, exactly the same as in
Peng (1999) from crisp option prioritization.
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6.5 Summary
The fuzzy option prioritization methodology is developed to aid the modeling of uncertain
preferences as fuzzy preferences within the framework of the GMCR. Equation 6.1 is intro-
duced to represent fuzzy incremental score of a state for a preference statement while (6.2)
gives the overall fuzzy score of a state for a DM, both capturing preference uncertainty
via fuzzy truth values of the DM’s preference statements at feasible states. The fuzzy
scores of states are then utilized to define a fuzzy relation in (6.3), which is established
later as a fuzzy preference relation. It is also proved that the fuzzy option prioritization
methodology generalizes the existing crisp option prioritization technique in the sense that
the crisp option prioritization is a special case of the fuzzy option prioritization.
When applied to the Elmira groundwater contamination conflict, the methodology not
only models fuzzy preferences for the DMs efficiently so that they are close to those that
were obtained by detailed human pairwise comparison of states, but also accomplishes it
without difficulty. Of course, fuzzy preferences may be modeled by pairwise comparison of
states for small problems. But, for larger conflicts, modeling fuzzy preferences by pairwise
comparison of states is unrealistic and may be impossible. However, fuzzy option priori-
tization can be applied to a conflict model of any size to model DMs’ fuzzy preferences.




Conclusions and Future Work
7.1 Conclusions
The key to the applicability of the GMCR is that it contains both modeling and analysis
components. Many real-world conflict decision problems exhibit preference uncertainty,
but until now there was no suitable methodology to model and analyze them. This thesis
has remedied this problem.
Together with the non-cooperative form of fuzzy stabilities, the concepts of coalitional
form of fuzzy stabilities are put forward to provide follow-up analysis of a dispute. Address-
ing the difficulties of modeling fuzzy preferences from uncertain preference information, the
fuzzy option prioritization methodology is developed within the framework of the GMCR
to efficiently model fuzzy preferences of DMs for use in the graph model fuzzy stability
analysis. The main contributions of this study are summarized below:
1. A fuzzy preference framework for a two-DM graph model is developed to introduce
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fuzzy stability concepts and apply them to simple conflicts with two DMs who have
uncertain preferences over feasible states. Specifically,
• The concept of an FRCP is introduced to characterize preference intensity be-
tween two feasible states in the presence of preference uncertainty (Section 3.2).
• A parameter called “FST” is introduced to take into account the interacting
DMs’ satisficing behavior in strategic conflicts, and is incorporated into the
graph model fuzzy stability definitions (Section 3.3).
• To identify states to which a DM would be willing to move to, the concept of
an FUI for a DM is put forward (Section 3.4).
• The four basic crisp stability definitions for a two-DM graph model—R, GMR,
SMR, and SEQ—are generalized as FR, FGMR, FSMR, and FSEQ to facilitate
the (fuzzy) stability analysis of a two-DM graph model with uncertain preference
information (Section 3.5).
• The fuzzy stability definitions for a two-DM graph model are illustrated using
the sustainable development conflict. It is found that the developers’ satisficing
behavior greatly influences the fuzzy stability results, which is quite reasonable
because developers’ decisions in development activities are volatile and mostly
context-dependent. Environmental agencies’ roles in choosing how strictly to
enforce environmental regulations may guide developers’ satisficing behavior. If
developers want to grab every last penny, environmental security will remain un-
der threat and environmental disasters can never be completely avoided (Section
3.6).
2. The fuzzy preference framework for the two-DM graph model is extended to ac-
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commodate graph models with any number of DMs, generalizing the fuzzy stability
definitions. More specifically,
• The concept of an FUI by a group or coalition of DMs is introduced for use in
the fuzzy stabilities (Section 4.2).
• FGMR, FSMR, and FSEQ stability definitions for a two-DM graph model are
extended for a general n-DM (n ≥ 2) graph model. In these definitions, fuzzy
stabilities for a DM depend on the responses (credible or not) of the coalition of
the remaining DMs, rather than the single opponent DM of the two-DM case.
Since FR stability does not depend on the responses by the opponent(s), the
FR stability definition for a general n-DM graph model remains the same as in
the two-DM case (Section 4.3).
• A fuzzy stability analysis is carried out on the Elmira groundwater contami-
nation conflict by employing the fuzzy stability definitions for an n-DM graph
model. This analysis predicts a new strong equilibrium (state s4), indicated in
Table 4.5, that is a possible resolution under all four fuzzy stability definitions.
The fuzzy stability results tableau provided in Table 4.4 demonstrates how a
DM’s satisficing criteria can affect the final outcome (Section 4.4).
• The FGM is shown to be a more general approach to decision making under
conflict compared to the crisp graph model, as it can handle both certain and
uncertain (fuzzy) preferences. Hence, the FGM constitutes an extension of the
crisp graph model that permits the modeling and analysis of more realistic mul-
tiple participant-multiple objective decision problems. In particular, by setting
the FST of each DM to 1.0, FGM becomes the crisp GMCR (Remarks 3.4.4,
4.2.2, and Theorem 4.3.6).
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• Like the crisp GMCR in which the associated preferences can be transitive or
nontransitive, the FGM is developed such that any transitive or nontransitive
fuzzy preferences can be utilized in the fuzzy stability calculations (Chapters 3
and 4).
3. The coalition fuzzy stability concept is developed as a follow-up analysis technique
within the FGM, intending to further analyze the individual level fuzzy stabilities of
a conflict model with uncertain preference information. In particular,
• The concepts of CFI and CCFI are introduced as tools for facilitating the coali-
tion fuzzy stability definitions (Section 5.2).
• The coalition fuzzy stability definitions for R, GMR, SMR, and SEQ stability
concepts of the GMCR are developed so that they constitute a natural general-
ization of the individual level FR, FGMR, FSMR and FSEQ stabilities (Section
5.3).
• Coalition fuzzy stability definitions can be applied to a crisp graph model by
assigning an FST of 1.0 to each DM, thereby making them more general coali-
tion analysis tools within the graph model structure. Accordingly, the four
coalition fuzzy stability definitions—CFR, CFGMR, CFSMR, and CFSEQ—
form a strong solution methodology for strategic conflicts with both certain and
uncertain preference information. Although the implementation of these stabil-
ities is not straightforward, a suitable decision support system could bring this
capability to the fingertips of the DM and the analyst (Section 5.3).
• A coalition fuzzy stability definition for a DM identifies states from which nei-
ther the DM himself or herself, nor any of the coalitions that he or she can
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join, would like to move away. These characteristics are justified regarding a
particular DM, M, when the coalition fuzzy stability definitions are applied to
the Elmira groundwater contamination conflict. Specifically, some states fail
to be coalition fuzzy stable for M that were fuzzy stable with respect to non-
cooperative fuzzy stability definitions. Accordingly, the coalition fuzzy stability
analysis may narrow down the list of individual-level fuzzy stabilities, thereby
providing the analyst with valuable strategic insights into the conflict under
study (Section 5.4).
• It can also be concluded from the application that the possible evolution of a
conflict from a status quo state to a final outcome can be conveniently explained
using CFILs. Therefore, as an analysis tool to augment individual-level fuzzy
stabilities, coalition fuzzy stability analysis constitutes an important addition
to the FGM (Section 5.4).
4. The fuzzy option prioritization methodology is developed within the FGM structure
to facilitate the modeling of fuzzy preferences for DMs involved in a strategic conflict
with uncertain preference information. Specifically,
• Fuzzy option prioritization is the first formal methodology to model a fuzzy
preference within the GMCR framework in order to deal with uncertain prefer-
ences. This technique offers flexibility to DMs or analysts who can assume the
intensity of truth of a preference statement at a feasible state to be any number
between 0 and 1, referred to as a fuzzy truth value (Chapter 6).
• A fuzzy preference relation over the set of feasible states is constructed by taking
into account the fuzzy truth values of preference statements at feasible states
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(Sections 6.2 and 6.3).
• The fuzzy option prioritization methodology generalizes the existing crisp option
prioritization technique in the sense that crisp option prioritization is a special
case of fuzzy option prioritization (Theorem 6.3.2).
• When applied to the Elmira groundwater contamination conflict, the method-
ology models fuzzy preferences for the DMs efficiently so that they are close to
those obtained by a complicated human assessment based on pairwise compar-
ison of states (Section 6.4).
• For larger problems, modeling fuzzy preferences by pairwise comparison of states
is unrealistic and may be impossible. However, the fuzzy option prioritization
methodology can be applied to a dispute of any size without difficulty (Chapter
6).
• Since the FGM is developed in this research to study multiple participant-
multiple objective decision problems by carrying out fuzzy stability analysis
and coalition fuzzy stability analysis based on DMs’ fuzzy preferences, the in-
troduction of the fuzzy option prioritization methodology, an efficient tool to
model fuzzy preferences, will make the FGM more useful (Chapters 3, 4, 5, and
6).
7.2 Future Work
The FGM methodology developed in this PhD thesis is a complete fuzzy preference ap-
proach for both modeling and analyzing real-world multiple participant-multiple objective
decision problems with certain or uncertain preference information for DMs. However,
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fuzzy stability, introduced in this thesis, is a new concept and may therefore be integrated
with recent developments and initiatives within the framework of the GMCR. A number
of directions for potential future research is listed below.
• Matrix Representations of the Fuzzy Stability Definitions : A recent addition to the
GMCR is a matrix representation of the graph model solution concepts for easy
computer coding and manipulation (Xu et al., 2009a,b, 2011). This idea may be
adapted to FGM to represent fuzzy stability definitions.
• Fuzzy Stabilities with Transitive Fuzzy Preferences : The fuzzy stability definitions
proposed in this thesis are based on fuzzy preferences that are not restricted by any
transitivity property. However, various transitivity properties may be imposed on
fuzzy preferences to study their implications for fuzzy stability.
• Fuzzy Status Quo Analysis : Status quo analysis technique (Li et al., 2004b, 2005a,b)
was developed within the crisp GMCR to inspect whether a potential resolution (i.e.,
an equilibrium state) is attainable from the status quo state, and to analyze how
DMs may act and interact to direct a conflict to that attainable resolution. A fuzzy
version of the status quo analysis technique may be developed within the FGM to
keep track of the evolution of a conflict from the status quo state to a FE.
• Fuzzy Stability Definitions for Other Stability Types : The fuzzy stability definitions
introduced in this study are FR, FGMR, FSMR, and FSEQ. However, fuzzy stability
definitions for other graph model stability concepts, such as limited move and non-
myopic stabilities, may be defined by imposing appropriate transitivity property on
DMs’ fuzzy preferences.
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• Use of Other Techniques to Model Fuzzy Preferences : Fuzzy option prioritization,
developed in this thesis, is the only methodology to formally model fuzzy preferences
for DMs with uncertain preference information in a graph model, based on fuzzy
truth values of preference statements at feasible states. Other techniques may be
developed to represent DMs’ fuzzy preferences by taking into account other uncertain
information about preferences, such as fuzzy utilities, fuzzy option weighting, and
fuzzy multi-criteria decision making.
• Use of Other Types of Fuzzy Preferences : There may be a fuzzy preference relation
in which the additive reciprocity condition is not met; that is, there may be a certain
degree for a pair of states to which a DM does not prefer one state of the pair over
the other. Techniques may be developed within the GMCR framework to handle this
type of fuzzy preference relation.
• Decision Support System for FGM: Calculating various graph model fuzzy stabilities
by hand is tedious even for a small model. Therefore, the design of a suitable decision
support system for the FGM may be an important future project.
• Applications to Challenging Real-World Conflicts : FGM can be applied to many
challenging real-world disputes to gain strategic insights.
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